Allies, he lacked unified support at home, where his political opponents called for a " strong peace " that would annihilate Germany; there was little enthusiasm for a League of Nations, which the President regarded as essential to a just and lasting settlement. Furthermore he had weakened his political position at home by a series of tactical mistakes. Of these, the most important was an appeal issued immediately before the Con- gressional election of Nov., in which Mr. Wilson asked the voters to cast their ballots for Democratic candidates, on the ground that a Republican Congress would divide the leader- ship at the moment of international crisis. Such an appeal would have been comprehensible if it had been made by a prime minister in a parliamentary country, but Wilson had proclaimed himself the leader of the nation and could not logically also play the r61e of party leader. The Republicans seemed to have some ground for complaining that although they had submerged partizan quarrels during the war, President Wilson was now attempting to capitalize the war and foreign affairs in order to win a partizan advantage. Many voters were antagonized by the appeal, and the elections went in favour of the Republicans. The President thus lost command of the Senate in the next Con- gress and its Foreign Relations Committee was to be controlled by his political and other opponents. Believing that his pres- ence at the Peace Conference was necessary, if it was not to be dominated by old-style diplomatic practices, Mr. Wilson de- cided himself to go to Paris, and on Dec. 4 1918 sailed with the other members of the American Commission on the " George Washington." He arrived at Brest on Dec. 13, and was received at Paris, in England, and at Rome with tremendous enthusiasm. For the moment he was the popular hero, both in Allied and enemy countries. But his prestige rested on a precarious footing, and must inevitably diminish when he came to oppose the national aspirations of any people. He was anxious, there- fore, to strike off a quick general peace, leaving details for later settlement;' but this proved impossible, and formal con- versations at Paris began only in Jan. 1919. The President succeeded in winning an early victory when he persuaded the conference to accept the principle of the League of Nations as the basis of the peace, and when, on Feb. 14, he won unanimous approval of the preliminary draft of the covenant. On return- ing to the United States, however, he found Republican opposi- tion to the league strongly manifested in the Senate, although he had the support of Mr. Taft's influence in that party and in the country. Public opinion seemed to be uninstructed and apathetic as to the President's policies. Going back to Paris in March, he was able to secure the insertion in the covenant of certain amendments required by American sentiment, and the approval by the conference of the final draft of the covenant. But he was confronted by the demands of the French, Italians and Japanese for territorial and economic concessions from the enemy, which he regarded as excessive. Long discussions followed, culminating in Mr. Wilson's acceptance of a portion of the Allied demands, notably the granting of Shantung to the Japanese, of much of the frontier line promised by the Treaty of London to Italy, and the exaction from Germany of what amounted to a blank cheque in the matter of reparations. Such concessions aroused the opposition of liberals in England and America, who insisted that the President had surrendered his principles. Mr. Wilson, on the other hand, acknowledging that certain aspects of the settlement were not ideal, believed that he had won his main contention in securing the League of Nations, which provided the mechanism for eradicating the vices contained in the treaties. In this belief he was supported by another liberal protagonist, Gen. Smuts. On June 29 1919, the day following the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the President sailed for America. His international prestige had suffered from his opposition to national claims, especially that of the Italians to Fiume and of the French to the left bank of the Rhine. Nevertheless, as the bitterness of the moment passed, the magnitude of his accomplishments at Paris became more generally recognized. When the veil of secrecy surrounding the negotiations was gradually lifted, it was seen that the belief that
he had been outmanoeuvred by Lloyd George and Clemenceau was hardly justified by the facts. Lacking the negotiating ability of Lloyd George and the political experience of Clemen- ceau, he refused to enter the diplomatic lists with them, but by his manifest candour and sincerity early disarmed his oppo- nents in argument. He said exactly what was in his mind, and was careful that his statements should be fortified by the docu- ments and statistics furnished by his expert advisers.
The strain of the conference had told upon Mr. Wilson's physical and nervous strength. He was thus not well equipped to wage the struggle with his Republican opponents in the Senate which developed upon his presentation of the treaty. Had the Presi- dent been willing to compromise and accept reservations to the covenant of the league, it is possible that the two-thirds neces- sary to ratification might have been secured. This course he refused to follow, and it soon became clear that the Foreign Relations Committee would not recommend ratification without serious reservations or amendments. In the hope of winning popular support, the President set forth upon a tour of the country and along the Pacific coast aroused enthusiasm in marked contrast to the coldness of the east. The effort, however, over- taxed his strength, and on Sept. 26 at Wichita, Kan., the Pres- ident was compelled to give over his tour and return to Washing- ton, where he suffered a complete nervous collapse. The exact nature of his illness was not made public and few realized how serious it would prove to be. Many, however, felt that in view of his inevitable abstention from active work, it would have been wiser for him to retire at least temporarily. As it was, his system had provided for no understudy and the administra- tion was left without a leader. Entirely apart from the confu- sion thus caused in the conduct of the public business, Mr. Wilson's illness led directly to the defeat of the treaty. There was no one else capable either of leading the fight for ratification without reservations, or with sufficient authority to arrange a compromise. On Nov. 14 the Senate adopted reservations which Mr. Wilson declared would " nullify " (etc., etc.) the treaty; for this reason he urged the Democrats to refuse to vote j for the ratifying resolution, which was accordingly defeated on , Nov. 19 1919. During the succeeding weeks efforts were made to arrange a compromise. The Republican leaders agreed to j soften the language of certain reservations, and the President intimated that he would accept a mild reservation on Article X. of the covenant, which had aroused the chief opposition. Neither side would yield enough, and when on March 19 1920, | the final vote was taken on the ratifying resolution, which con- 1 tained a strong reservation on Article X., Mr. Wilson again urged Democratic senators not to accept. The resolution thus ; failed of the necessary two-thirds by a margin of seven votes, ; 57-37. The President appealed to the autumn presidential election in 1920 as the decisive plebiscite. Although he had lost his former control of the party, and the Democratic prcsi- , dcntial nominee at San Francisco was not his choice, the! Wilsonian policies, including approval of the League of Nations, : were inevitably the issue of the elections. In the electioneering! campaign, however, the President himself could take no active! part, for his physical collapse proved so serious as to confine 1 him to the White House. For the overwhelming victory won: by the Republicans, see UNITED STATES (History). After his defeat Mr. Wilson kept close silence on public matters, and his annual message of Dec. 1920, while it sounded the note of national duty, made no reference to that which lay nearest his^ heart the League of Nations. This silence, indeed, he pre-j served until the close of his administration, March 4 1921. In Dec. 1920 he had been awarded the Nobel Peace prize.
The failure of President Wilson to win the approval of the! United States for his peace policies presents one of the most interesting problems of American history. He had led the country through the difficult period of a war unsurpassed in magnitude and culminating in complete victory; in the face of serious obstacles he had forced European statesmen to accept the major item in his programme; he returned home only to bei repudiated by his own people. Personal and partizan factors
