offensive of Sept. 25 1915 in Champagne (see CHAMPAGNE, part III.), but without materially affecting the stability of the trench- warfare conditions. The year 1916 opened with the great German blow at VERDUN (q.v.), which forestalled the Allied offen- sive of the SOMME (q.v. part I.): these two great names fill the history of the 1916 campaign in the west. In 1917 a first essay in operating under a united command was made by the Allies in the spring campaign, and produced the Arras battles described under ARTOIS (part III.), and the Aisne offensive of April (see CHAM- PAGNE, part IV.) ; the results were disappointing, and the parts of the inter-allied machine fell asunder, the British taking up the weight of the task in the battles around Messines, Ypres, Passchendael, etc. (see YPRES AND THE YSER, part III.), and in the " tank-battle " of CAMBRAI (see ARTOIS, section I.), while the French carried through two battles of limited objective, de- scribed under CHAMPAGNE (part IV.) and VERDUN.
Meantime, the entry of Italy into the war in 1915 had created new military relations in the Mediterranean basin. Austria had established a new defensive front on the Isonzo, and, shortly after the Verdun offensive of her ally, had struck a similar blow on the Tirol front at Asiago. The unity of operations in the Italian theatre of war makes it possible to refer the reader to a single heading, ITALIAN FRONT CAMPAIGNS, with the subordinate articles therein referred to, for the story of the war in this region from first to last.
On the Russian front, the year 1916 saw a final effort of Russia, in spite of losses, to regain lost ground and to help her Allies. The battles, after an isolated winter battle known as the " New Year's fight," described under the heading STRYPA-CZERNOWITZ, fall into two main groups, those of the spring and those of the summer and autumn, in which the battles of NAROCH LAKE (q.v.) and LUCK (q.v.) are the central episodes.
The spring of the final year, 1918, finds the focus of military events in Europe placed on that section of the front in France which lies north of the Oise. Here, on March 21, the great Ger- man offensive broke through the lines of the British V. Army (see SOMME, part III.) ; here also, on April 9, a second effort was made at the LYS (q.v.). In summer, the German attacks of May 27 on the Chemin dcs Dames (see CHAMPAGNE, part V.), of June 9 on NOYON (q.v.), and .of July 15 on both sides of Reims (see CHAMPAGNE, part VI.) , culminate, and the period of Allied counter- attacks under united command begins with July 18 (see CHAM- PAGNE, part VII.), Aug. 8 (see SOMME, part IV.), Aug. 21 (see SOMME, part V.) and St. Mihiel (see WOEVRE), to assume at last a coherent and decisive form in the three simultaneous offensives of the Americans in the MEUSE-ARGONNE((/.!).)battle, of the Brit- ish in the battle of CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN (q.v.) and the Belgians, British and French in the last battle of YPRES (q.v.).
As regards the origin of the World War, its history is told in the article EUROPE, in the final section of which its results on the national reshaping of Europe after the war are analyzed. Reference on both these aspects may also be made to the histori- cal and geographical sections of the articles dealing with each country involved in the war. But during the war itself the politi- cal aspects ceased to be merely European: it became a World War. The general international politics throughout its course are therefore dealt with under the present heading, in the article below, as distinctively world-history, by way of continuation of the historical article under EUROPE which deals with the inter- national politics of Europe up to August 1914. (H. CH.)
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE WAR 1
From the moment hostilities began in 1914, it became the absorbing aim of all the combatant countries to win the war;
' l For side-lights on conflicting national viewpoints in connexion with particular episodes, and for greater detail in regard to them the accounts being still sometimes irreconcilable as between repre- sentatives of the different countries concerned, see the separate historical articles under country headings: especially h-NGLisH HISTORY, UNITED STATES (History), AUSTRIAN EMPIRE (Foreign Policy), GERMANY (History), FRANCE (History), ITALY (History), JAPAN (Foreign Relations), SERBIA (History), YUGOSLAVIA (History), CZECHOSLOVAKIA (History), GREECE (History).
but each of them placed a different interpretation upon the meaning of victory, and that meaning also varied with their fortunes, the eclipse of this or that belligerent, and the entrance of fresh forces into the arena. The war aims of Great Britain were tersely stated in general terms by Mr. Asquith at the Guild- hall on Nov. 9 1914, when he declared: " We shall never sheathe the sword, which we have not lightly drawn, until Belgium re- covers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggres- sion, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." France and Russia, while agreeing with these objects, mentally put a more concrete interpretation on victory: to France the symbol of victory was the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine with further guarantees against a repetition of 1870-1; while Russia desired to exorcise Prussian apparitions " in shining armour " at Petro- grad and to secure control of Constantinople and the. Straits.
The Original Combatants. Germany was less single-minded' in her ideas. The mass of her people had been persuaded that the war was one of defence against a Pan-Slav peril and hostile encirclement by other Powers; but the bourgeois classes looked for Weltmacht in the shape of commercial and colonial expan- sion, while Bernhardi expressed the mind of Prussian militarists when he demanded three years before the war that " France must be so completely crushed that she can never cross our path again." Behind such ebullitions was a growing conviction in the Prussian mind that the Prussian system of government could not long maintain itself against social democracy without fresh tributes to the efficacy of the sword. " This danger," wrote Prince von Billow, " must be faced and met with a great and comprehensive national policy under the strong guidance of clear-sighted and courageous governments, which whether amicably or by fighting can make the parties bow to the might of the national idea." " Nor," concluded Bernhardi, " must we think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem to be forced upon a statesman by the condition of home affairs." To Austria the compulsion came from the attitude of Yugoslavs within her borders; and her original war aims probably did not extend beyond the reduction of Serbia to dependence and the consequent eclipse of Russian prestige in the Balkans. For Belgium and for Serbia the object of the war was primarily self-defence, although in Serbia's case suc- cessful self-defence would inevitably bring with it the prospect of increased influence in the domestic affairs of the Habsburg Empire. Japan was bound to intervene by her alliance with Great Britain, but a positive inducement to fulfil its terms was held out by the opportunity of conquering Kiaochow and ex- cluding Germany from Far Eastern waters.
Not much choke had in fact been left to these original com- batants by the circumstance of past policy which had driven them into the war. Other Powers had freer hands and a market in which they could sell their alliance to buyers who would bid high. They could intervene or hold aloof, and the nature and extent of the price they set on their services would modify the war aims of those whose cause they espoused. The course, the objects, and the end of the war were profoundly affected by the gradual expansion of the hostile groups.
The leading part played by Germany in the movements which precipitated the outbreak is emphasized by the fact that Austria, having declared war on Serbia on July 28, remained at peace with all other States for several days after Germany had drawn the sword. It was not until Aug. 6 that Austria de- clared war on Russia, nor until the loth and i2th that France and Great Britain declared war upon her, nor until the 27th that she declared war on Belgium, the German invasion of which hail dragged in Great Britain three weeks before. So far as Austria was concerned, the Triple Alliance had been purely defensive, and it had not even bound her to defend Germany against France, unless Russia also intervened. Italy, on the other hand, had been bound to assist Germany against a French attack; and the legends about French aggression, which Germany
