the commanders and some of the staff of the ist and 2nd Divs. were knocked out by a shell which struck their headquarters; Haig prepared to retire to a line just in front of Ypres and hold on there at all costs.
But the Germans could not exploit their success; the Wor- cesters, in local reserve, thrown in at 2 P.M., checked the enemy's progress, and secured a position from which they could flank any further advance beyond Gheluvelt. The left of the XV. Corps had been held up by the 7th Div., assisted by the local reserves, and had been unable to exploit the exposure of its immediate enemy's flank caused by the loss of Gheluvelt. The Bavarian II. Corps indeed forced its way forward some- what against the right of the 7th Div. and the 3rd Cav. Div., but its advance also eventually came to a stand, as had that of its comrades on the right and left of it. A gap which opened in the right wing of the 7th Div. late in the afternoon was oppor- tunely filled by the arrival of the 7th Cav. Bde. which threw back the enemy.
It was clear that the enemy would not desist from his efforts, which had on the 3ist brought him so near to success, but that further fierce attacks might be anticipated on the following days. The situation seemed therefore dark enough; the troops of the French VIII. Army, with which it had been intended to assume a large scale counter-offensive against both flanks of the enemy group attacking the British I. Corps, had had to be thrown in piecemeal to support various weak points in the line, and only one division, the 43rd, was left in general reserve W. of Ypres. Certain units even of this division had been sent into line before nightfall on the 3ist in the vicinity of St. Eloi.
The fighting on Nov. i, as was expected, was little if at all less severe than on the two preceding days. The main pressure, however, had shifted from the front of the British I. Corps over the Ypres-Comines canal to that of the cavalry corps. In the N. the enemy's efforts, which were not very vigorous, broke down before the readjusted lines of the ist and 7th Divs., and the 3rd Cav. Div. The fighting, which had continued all through the night of the 3ist-ist around Wytschaete and Messines, had already placed the cavalry corps in a difficult position, their line being broken at several points, and only partly reestablished; however, the main German attack did not take place till noon, when the Bavarian 6th Reserve Div. and the 26th Div. advanced. Wytschaete, lost between 2 and 3 A.M. on the 3 ist, was still at this time in German hands, despite the efforts of reinforcements from the 3rd Div., sent up from the S. and from the 5th Cav. Bde. with French units of the 32nd and 43rd Divs., but the village was recovered about 6 P.M. and held firmly by the French. The loss of Wytschaete had been followed by that of Messines; the ist Cav. Div. were drawn back to an entrenched line N. of Wulverghem, and later relieved by parts of the French XVI. and XX. Corps and of Conneau's cavalry. The situation, which had at one time seemed critical, was thus saved by the arrival of French and British reinforce- ments, and by the evening gave rise to less anxiety. The attack was continued next day by the Germans, who had put in a new division, the 3rd, on the left of the Bavarian 6th Reserve, and the fight swayed to and fro all day. By the evening Wytschaete and the crest of the ridge had been lost, but the French line was firmly settled on the rear slopes of the ridge to the west.
Gen. d'tlrbal had not yet however abandoned all hope of a successful offensive, but the attempts of the French to advance on the 2nd and following days were neutralized by renewed efforts on the part of the enemy, and only in the Merckem- Bixschoote area was some slight progress made. On Nov. 5 d'Urbal received instructions from Joffre, which stated that the Flanders theatre of operations had lost some of its importance since neither Allied nor German attacks could hope to gain any further appreciable result, and that it was intended shortly to withdraw troops from the VIII. Army for use elsewhere.
Meanwhile the British dispositions had undergone some changes; the 7th Div. being relieved by two composite bri- gades from the II. Corps, and the French IX. Corps taking oyer part of the I. Corps front.
A renewed period of activity on the British front occurred in a few days, when these reliefs had been barely completed. On the 6th and 7th the 7th Cav. Bde. and units of the 7th and ist Divs. recovered some ground lost by the French near Zwartelen; attacks on the 7th and 8th against the 3rd Drv. E. of Keren thage wood and the ist Div. and the French farther N. were also successfully dealt with. This was but the mutter- ing before the bursting of the last storm.
The Germans, determined to make one last push for Ypres, formed on the gth a new army group under von Linsingen, consisting of the XV. Corps and a composite corps, made up of the 4th Div. and a division of the Guard. This was put in on the left of the Fabeck group with orders to drive back and crush the enemy N. of the Ypres-Comines canal. The Fabeck group was to cooperate with infantry and artillery. This attack, timed for the nth, was to be prefaced by an advance of the whole IV. Army on the previous day from Dix- mude S. to Polygon wood. The southern part of this attack however did not get going.
The Final Battle, and the Stabilization of the Flanders Front, Nov. 8-20. The attack on Dixmude was entrusted to the 4th Ersatz Div. and the XXII. Reserve Corps and took place on Nov. 10. The garrison of Belgian infantry and French Marine Fusiliers had been reinforced by French colonial troops and the Germans had to pay dearly for their success. The bombard- ment opened at dawn and the infantry attack at 7:40 A.M. It failed and was renewed after further artillery preparation at 9:30 A.M. By i P.M. the garrison had been driven from the eastern suburb and the town was assailed from N.E., E., and S.E. After desperate fighting, lasting till nightfall, the Germans succeeded in securing possession of the ruins of Dixmude. The garrison withdrew to the W. bank of the Yser and broke the bridges, but the enemy made only half-hearted attempts to follow them. They claimed to have taken in the town about 1,400 prisoners and much material. Further to the S., in the Bixschoote-Langemarck area, the German attacks made little headway. The British front was not attacked on the loth.
Its turn was to come on the nth, when the Fabeck and Linsingen groups attacked on the whole front from the Menin road to S. of Messines, about 9:30 in the morning, after two hours' bombardment. A thick mist veiled and assisted their advance. On the right of the assault the 12 battalions of the Guard struck against the line held by the weakened British ist and pth Bdes., and some French Zouaves. Their right broke past the S. side of Polygon wood, and swept the defenders out of Nonne Boschen, but their further progress was stayed on the western edge of this copse, and shortly after noon a counter- attack by the 2nd Oxon. and Bucks. L.I. forced them out of it again. The centre and left of the Guard, after some initial suc- cess in Inverness copse and Herenthage wood, were also held up and compelled to abandon most of their guns. Further S. also little progress had rewarded the Germans' efforts. The XV. Corps had to content itself with the capture of Hill 60; the Bavarian II. Corps gained some success N. of Wytschaete; elsewhere the attackers had been kept to their trenches.
This day's fighting was the closing act of the Ypres battle. Both sides were entirely exhausted by close on a month of sustained and bitter fighting, which had thinned their ranks, drained their supply of munitions, and left them no available reserves which could be employed in further effort. On Nov. 1 5 General d'Urbal came to the decision to suspend further offen- sive activity, consolidate his position and allow his troops a period for rest and refitment. Joffre, however, felt that the operations on the Flanders front had reached their fitting ter- mination with the repulse of the enemy's last desperate effort to bring about a decision in the open field; and accordingly instruct- ed d'Urbal to hold himself henceforward on the defensive.
The Germans on their side had also come to an end of their resources. On the i7th the German IV. Army commander, after the failure of a final effort by the 4th Div. in Herenthage wood, " decided to give up any idea of continuing the offensive a decision to which he was compelled by the low fighting strength
