portion of which was energized by the current from a lo-volt accumulator. It was intended for work in posts close to the front line and at brigade and battalion headquarters and the complete station with its two i s-foot masts could be carried by a party of three men. Both types of set fulfilled their original purpose admirably. They remained the standard wireless sets for forward infantry command intercommunication purposes throughout the war, and have only gradually been superseded by the continuous- wave wireless sets which are now the standard sets for practically all purposes.
Other wireless sets which were evolved during the war, which owed their invention to the same necessity for indestructible and invisible alternative means of forward intercommunication, were the loop wireless sets. These were sets of short fixed wave-length (66 and 80 metres respectively) which were arranged in two complementary installations a " forward " and a " rear " sta- tion to each set. The forward station was distinguished by the possession of a rectangular aerial of folding tubing which could be erected wholly below the surface of the ground in a deep trench or in a dugout, thus rendering the station invisible and often invulnerable. The rear station had a short wire aerial, much of the type used with the standard "British field" (50- watt) set. It was intended, as its name suggests, for work at places not in the direct observation of the enemy. These sets with slight modifications, remain in use at the present day for intercommunication within the infantry battalion.
At least as important as this evolution of alternative methods was the consolidation and reorganization of the signal service which took place during the years of position warfare.
For the understanding of the present organization of an army signal service some account of the effect of the interaction be- tween the requirements of the general staff and the unfamiliar war conditions experienced in the years 1914-7 is essential. Whereas in the pre-war organization of the signal service the ruling consideration was mobility, a military situation arose within six months of the declaration of war, and continued for three years, in which extended movement was the exception and not the rule. The effect on the signal service was a multiplication of the calls for intercommunication made upon it and at the same time an increase in the unreliability of all means of forward sig- nalling. Work in the danger zone had usually to be done not once but many times; duplication of routes forward, first of bri- gade, and then of divisional headquarters, became essential. At the same time, the demands of the staffs, of the unit commanders, and especially of the artillery, increased manifold.
An establishment adequate to the demands of mobile warfare could not possibly cope with those of position warfare. The small degree of supervision and absence of coordination, due to the practical autonomy of the signal service within each formation, which had been recognized as drawbacks in the manoeuvre war- fare of 1914, became impossible obstacles to efficiency in 1915.
The first reforms which enabled order to be wrought out of the chaos into which forward signals were in danger of falling were (i) the vesting of the control of all forward signals in the hands of the divisional signal company commander and (2) the assump- tion by the signal service of responsibility for, and a measure of control over, artillery signals. By this means it proved possible towards the end of 1915 to eliminate unnecessary lines and to insist on the reeling-up of derelict cables. At the same time steps were taken to supplement the obviously inadequate personnel.
The original signal service units of the British Expeditionary Force of 1914 had consisted essentially of (a) the personnel to man one or at most two headquarters offices; (6) sufficient cable or airline detachments to lay one main route to all subordinate formations or units then considered to be entitled to telephone or telegraph; and (c) a few despatch riders, orderlies, and visual signallers. This establishment only just sufficed for the skeleton intercommunication system required in a mobile army, and neither office staff, line-building detachments, nor orderlies, were sufficient to man the greatly swollen system of position warfare. Reinforcements were essential, and not only reinforcements but radical reorganization as well. Much of the personnel required
was for the maintenance of heavily shelled, long divisional and corps lines through the danger area. If these routes were to be efficiently maintained and circuits allotted with due regard to the relative urgency of individual requirements, the men man- ning them must remain at their posts irrespective of divisional moves. This meant the formation of pools of area-maintenance personnel and units at corps or army headquarters and the crea- tion of these pools was one of the main features of signal reorgan- ization during the position-warfare period. Individual increases to the mobile portions of units also took place, corresponding to changes in signal methods (all in the direction of increased com- plexity) or alterations in procedure (e.g. the assumption of re- sponsibility for artillery and machine-gun signals) which applied equally in position and in mobile warfare.
The increases in the strength of signal units during the war are indicated by the figures in the annexed table, which gives the strength of the signal personnel in an army of two corps, each of three divisions, in 1914 (when the only equivalent of an army signal company was the G.H.Q. signal company) and in 1918, respectively.
Strength, 1914, at Mobilization.
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Each
Total
Unit
Off
Other Ranks
Off
Other Ranks
G.H.Q. signal company . Two! army corps H.Q. com
5
75
5
75
panies ....
4
63
8
126
5 airline sections
i
57
5
285
8 cable sections.
i
35
8
280
6 divisional signal companies
5
157
30
942
Total personnel
,S6
1708
Strength at Armistice, iQi8.
Unit
Each
Total
Off
Other Ranks
Off
Other Ranks
One army signal company
IS
340
15
34
2 cable sections .
i
34
2
68
3 airline sections .
i
43
3
129
8 area signal detachments .
i
13
8
104
One signal construction com-
pany One light railway signal com-
3
"3
3
"3
pany
i
61
i
61
9 army, field artillery bri-
gade sig. sub-sections
i
'9
9
171
17 heavy artillery group sig.
sub-sections
i
28
'7
476
Two corps signal companies .
6
105
12
210
4 airline sections .
I
43
4
172
4 cable sections .
I
34
4
136
Six divisional signal compan-
ies
15
400
90
2400
Total personnel
168
4380
While the above description applies principally to the evolution of organization in the general signal service, some special mention of the alterations which took place in wireless units is necessary, particularly since wireless telegraphy will in all probability play a more dominant part in the intercommunication service of the army of the future. The few wireless sets which were in use in the British Expeditionary Force at the outbreak of war were manned by personnel who were all incorporated in a single "wireless section" which shortly became a "wireless company." The first great increase in the value of army wireless came with its application to intelligence purposes, originally for the simple interception of enemy wireless messages, and then also for the location of enemy wireless sets whether in the field, at sea, or in the air. For this latter use of wireless alone, " position finding " many special sets were devised and a numerous personnel collected in special intelligence wireless units.
Next, the invention and perfection of the portable "trench" wireless sets in 1915 and 1916 created a further demand for wireless personnel and increased the already swollen establishment of the central "wireless company." The result was a measure of devolution and the formation of an army wireless company in each army. The commanding officer of this unit acted as staff officer for wireless to the chief signal officer of the army, and was
