from 10-20 days in the North Sea, but when working in the Channel from Flanders rarely more than twelve. Submarines cruised nor- mally on the surface. When attacking they usually proceeded at periscope depth (about 45 ft. for U boats), cruising at 65-85 ft"., and going to 150 ft. if attacked. The fact that a periscope was rarely visible, even with glasses, at over a mile, emphasizes the difficulty of counter-attack.
German Submarine Flotillas. The flotillas were distributed in four principal commands the North Sea (or High Sea fleet) flotillas working from the Bight and usually termed the North Sea flotillas; the Flanders flotillas working from Zeebrugge; the Mediterranean based on Pola, Cattaro and Constantinople, and the Baltic (or Kurland) flotilla working from Baltic ports. The Flanders flotilla consisted wholly of UB and UC boats and was allotted a definite area of operations, which extended on the east coast of Great Britain as far as Flamborough Head (Yorks), and in the Channel as far as 7 W. (about as far as Waterford) and down to the Gironde. At the beginning of the year 1916 the strength of the various flotillas was approximately North Sea 16, Baltic 6, Flanders 18, Mediter- ranean 12. There were 16 boats approaching completion, and 161 boats building and being delivered at the rate of 8 to 10 a month.
Campaign of 1916. The year 1916 was marked by another long-drawn-out controversy between the German Chancellor and the naval staff. The Chancellor stood out against unrestricted naval warfare (that is sinking at sight) ; the naval staff fought for it. Nor were their arguments lacking in force. If a submarine came to the surface at a distance a ship could run away, if it rose close at hand it was exposed to fire from an armed merchant- man or decoy ship. In Jan. 1916 the German naval staff pre- sented a memorandum claiming that unrestricted warfare would force England to make peace in six months. It stated that from Feb. to Oct. 1915 one or two steamers, averaging 4,085 tons, had been sunk daily by each submarine. This was an exaggerated estimate, for the figures for British ships in 191 5 were more nearly one-third of a ship per submarine per day, but on this basis they calculated a loss of 631,000 tons a month, at which rate it was estimated that England would be reduced to her knees in six months. A definitive audience took place at Great Head- quarters on March 6 1916, when it was decided to postpone its execution till April i' in order to bring all possible means of persuasion to bear on the United States in the attempt to recon- cile them to the idea.
Von Tirpitz, in despair at the continual frustration of his plans, resigned, and his place was taken by Adml. von Capelle. Five days before the prescribed date UBi8 (Steinbrinck) tor- pedoed the " Sussex " on March 24 1.916 on her way from Folke- stone to Dieppe with 25 American citizens on board; and though she remained afloat, the forepart of the vessel was blown up and some 80 passengers were killed and injured. America's patience now came to an end, and on April 18 President Wilson threatened to break off diplomatic relations. The German Government gave way, and abandoning the idea of ruthless warfare issued an order on April 25 precluding submarines from sinking any mer- chant ship at sight, and requiring them in their war against trade to act in strict accordance with the methods prescribed by prize law, which entailed stopping a ship, examining her papers and giving all the crew and passengers an opportunity to leave her before proceeding to any act of destruction.
Meanwhile the chief of the naval staff at Berlin had issued an order, which came into force on Feb. 29 1916, that armed mer- chantmen were to be regarded as warships, and the attention of German submarine commanders was called to a clause in the prize regulations under which all merchantmen which might attack a German or neutral ship were to be regarded as pirates. This found its sequel on March 28, when Capt. Fryatt in his ship the " Brussels " attacked 1133 on her way to Holland, and, being captured with his ship by a German destroyer on June 23, was tried and shot (July 27 1916).
The decision against unrestricted warfare came as a bitter disappointment to Adml. Scheer, who received the order on his way to carry out the Lowestoft raid on April 25 1916. He im- mediately recalled all the High Sea fleet submarines and ordered them to cease operations against merchant shipping. He refused to have anything to do with what he called the blunt edge of the weapon, and had decided that if they were not to be used in un- restricted warfare he would use them only in fleet operations.
The Flanders command followed suit with most of its boats, and the Mediterranean flotillas were left to continue the campaign against commerce alone. Just as Adml. Scheer's order went out an extensive barrage was being laid off the Belgian coast (April 24) by the Dover Patrol (Vice-Adml. Sir Reginald Bacon). This was an effort on a large scale to cope with the submarine by a combination of mines and mine-nets. It consisted of some 18 m. of moored nets fitted with net mines, supported by lines of mines, running parallel to and about 12 m. off the Belgian coast. It was completed by May 71916 and a patrol was maintained on it by day from May to October. It is difficult to estimate its precise value, for the diminished activity ascribed to it at Dover was undoubtedly due to the cessation of submarine operations on political grounds from May to Sept. 1916. No doubt it made work more difficult for Flanders submarines, but the mines were poor and notoriously ineffective. A single boat (1)83) was destroyed in its vicinity the day it was laid by a lance bomb thrown from a drifter, the " Gleaner of the Sea." Another (UB 10) ran into it and took eight hours to clear with net mines exploding . all round her, and though the work entailed in the barrage de- serves a generous meed of praise no submarine was actually destroyed by it in 1916, and it certainly never prevented the entry and exit of the Flanders boats.
Steinbrinck, of the Flanders flotilla, was now sent to cruise in the Channel to report on the feasibility of warfare on the lines of prize law, which involved the stoppage and due warning of ships before destruction. His report was unfavourable, and dur- ing the summer the Flanders boats worked only on the E. coast. Scheer meanwhile used his Bight flotillas (reinforced with Flanders boats) in fleet operations, of which the most important were those of Jutland and Aug. 19, when the " Nottingham " and " Falmouth " were sunk by U52 and U66. It was on this . latter occasion that 23 (Lt.-Comdr. Robert Turner) torpedoed the German battleship " Westfalen " on its way out of the Bight. This was at 5:30 A.M., and on rising to the surface later at 10:10 A.M. he reported the German fleet to the C.-in-C., then some i So m. off, an incident which first brought into prominence the possibilities of the submarine in fleet reconnaissance work. During the summer the chief of the German naval staff was try- ing to persuade Scheer to modify his " harsh professional con- ception "of submarine warfare, and resume restricted war against commerce in accordance with prize law. The Mediterranean submarines had continued working on these lines with good re- sults; the Flanders flotilla had recommenced on a small scale in Sept. 1916, and the operations in concert with the fleet had only resulted in the sinking of two light cruisers. The " Deutsch- land," under Capt. Paul Konig, tried a trading venture across the Atlantic during the summer, reaching America on July 91916 and returning on Aug. 23 with a cargo of rubber, nickel, and tin, but the " Bremen " which followed her in Sept. was lost. U53, under Lt.-Comdr. Hans Rose, a skilful and chivalrous com- mander, crossed the Atlantic (leaving on Sept. 17 and arriving on Oct. 7) and sunk five merchantmen off Newport News. The " Deutschland " made a second trip across, arriving in New London on Nov. i and reaching Germany safely on Dec. 10 1916. There her mercantile career ended, and she was fitted out as a submarine-of-war and went off to work in the Azores. Archangel too became a sphere of activity for a time, and seven ships were sunk there in Oct., but the initial success did not continue, and in Nov. Us6 was sunk by Russian patrols. The German naval staff now decided that all flotillas were to resume the campaign against commerce in accordance with prize law, and orders to this effect were issued on Oct. 6 1916. Scheer had underestimated the power of legitimate warfare. The monthly average of all Allied and neutral merchant ships sunk by submarines had been 76 ships and 153,521 tons (gross) from Feb. to Sept. 1916. From Oct. 1916 to Jan. 1917 the average rose to 173 ships and 346,405 tons, and the campaign was extended with success to the Azores, Canaries and Madeira, where Funchal was bombarded on Dec. 3 by a converted mercantile.
"Unrestricted" Warfare, 1917. But during the autumn Scheer and the naval staff found powerful allies for the policy
