taking 1,650 prisoners, 13 guns and much war material, and the cavalry pursued the fleeing Osmanlis as far as 'Aziziya, halfway from Kut to Bagdad. The enterprise had in fact been carried out with a success equal to its audacity.
Kut was a locality of some strategical significance. Issuing here from the Tigris, the Shatt al 'Arab creates a link with the Euphrates at Nasiriya. The natural route for troops from Bagdad proceeding to the lowest reaches of the Euphrates immediately above Qurna would be by way of the Tigris and the Shatt al Hai. Therefore, installed in his new position at Kut, Townshend in a measure blocked both the routes from Upper Mesopotamia to Basra that following the Tigris right down to Qurna, and that turning off by the Shatt al Hai. Kut was furthermore the most important place between "Amara or Nasiriya and Bagdad, and its capture was calculated to exert a considerable moral influence over the Arabs who dwelt in this region and who were disposed to be troublesome. But almost the whole of the Anglo-Indian troops in the theatre of war, apart from detachments required for garrison duty nearer the Persian Gulf, had now been projected into an isolated situation far within the enemy's territory; they were, moreover, depending upon a long line of water communication, not easy to protect against marauding attacks and served by only a restricted number of steamers and smaller craft. But for the severe defeat suffered by the Turks at Es Sinn, the disposition of the invading forces at the beginning of Oct. would have justified some anxiety.
But the idea of pushing on to Bagdad had already taken shape even before the occupation of Kut. The Aug. discomfiture in the Gallipoli Peninsula (see DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN), coupled with a belated realization that the Dardanelles venture would not succeed, had rendered the Home Government eager for some dramatic achievement in Mesopotamia. The Indian Viceroy had advocated an advance to Bagdad when the start up the Tigris from 'Amara was materializing. Townshend's gratifying triumph acted as a stimulus to these aspirations, and during the month of Oct. there was much inter-communication between London, Simla and army headquarters in Mesopotamia on the subject of a further advance. Nixon intimated early in the month that he was strong enough to open a road to Bagdad under the circum- stances then existing, but he did not consider himself able to hold the city if taken. The question of even reaching the place, however, depended in reality upon whether the advance were to take place before the enemy was reinforced. The military authorities who were consulted at home, while admitting the possibility of capture, regarded permanent retention as out of the question with the limited forces available; they declared that, if Bagdad was to be held, the army in Mesopotamia must be reinforced by two divisions. Influenced by political considera- tions, however, the Home Government became more and more insistent. The dispatch of the two Indian divisions that were on the western front at the time to the Persian Gulf was under consideration, but it could not be promised at the moment. Although no reinforcements could be sent him, and although had they been sent him they could not have taken part in the opera- tion owing to the time that must elapse in getting them to the theatre of war and owing to the absence of water transport to move them and to feed them when they got there, Nixon was on the 3ist informed that he might advance on the city.
Townshend had pushed large parts of his force from Kut on to 'Aziziya while the discussion was proceeding. He found that the Turks were less demorah'zed by the reverses' they had met with than had at first been supposed, and they had been given time to rally and to reorganize. His own troops had been severely tried, and all his units were short of establishment. He enter- tained serious misgivings as to progressing farther, in view of the isolation of his force, of the length of his communications, and of the manifest insufficiency of that water transport which was the governing factor in any operations that he might have to undertake. Even after receiving his orders to advance, he was unable to move for a fortnight owing to time lost in getting up supplies to 'Aziziya and in organizing for the hazardous effort. On Nov. ii, however, the advance began, and on the 2ist the
Turks were dislodged from a fortified position at Laj. It was known that the enemy was in strong force at Ctesiphon and had constructed elaborate entrenchments at that point; news had also come that hostile reinforcements were expected. A night march was therefore carried out, and at dawn Townshend at-, tacked. The assault was most successful in the first instance. Two lines were carried and many prisoners were captured. But strong Ottoman reinforcements arrived on the battlefield while the fight was still in progress, and these recovered much of the ground that had been lost earlier in the day. For three days the two armies remained facing each other at Ctesiphon, the Turks being much superior in numbers and their array gradually swelling as fresh troops arrived from Bagdad. Townshend was in the meantime making all preparations for a retreat and was getting his wounded away a service of no small difficulty owing to the insufficiency of transport. Then on the night of the 25th he moved off.
His losses since quitting 'Aziziya amounted to 3,500 nearly one-third of his strength. Except in respect to cavalry, the enemy enjoyed a great advantage in numbers, and as soon as the re-; treat began the Arabs started harrying the retiring force. Still, thanks to Townshend's skilful dispositions and to the resolute marching of his weary troops, no great difficulty was experienced in evading grave molestation during the first four days of the backward march. But, owing to the flotilla of supply transports, barges and fighting craft being delayed by the shoals, and to : some of the craft getting aground, a halt had to be called on the 2Qth. This enabled the pursuing Ottoman columns to come up, and on Dec. i they delivered a resolute attack upon the Anglo- Indian force, but the assailants were beaten off after a sharp encounter and the retreat was then resumed. It had been neces- sary to abandon three steamers, but so great was the effect of the stalwart resistance offered by Townshend's sorely tried little army that it was little interfered with during its last three days of retreat. It assembled at Kut on Dec. 3, having suffered another i,ooo casualties since quitting Ctesiphon, but bringing in the i, 600 prisoners taken on Nov. 22.
So for the moment ended the Bagdad adventure. On Dec. 3 the first of the reinforcements spoken of six weeks before (when London and Simla were pressing for an advance) had only started a few days on their four weeks' voyage from France to the Shatt al "Arab. Military authorities had admitted the possibility of a successful dash on the city, but had denied the possibility of so small a force holding the city unless reinforced; and even had additional troops been available in the country, the water transport to get them up the river was lacking. When Townshend moved forward the best to be hoped for was that he might reach his goal and might then escape if he straightway hurried down the Tigris again. Seldom in the his- tory of war has a military force been committed to an undertak- ing so unwarrantable.
But worse, from the British point of view, was to follow. For, with the approval of the Home and Indian Governments, Nixon decided that Townshend should stop where he was, although if he did so he was bound to be invested. They assumed too readily that he would be relieved ere his supplies ran out. So his sick and wounded, his cavalry, most of the flotilla and a propor- tion of his animals were sent off down Tigris, although the civil- ian population was unfortunately allowed to remain; prepara- tions for a siege were put in hand ; and on the 8th Kut was hemmed in on all sides. Its situation in a deep loop on the left bank of the river rendered the place readily defensible against attack, and the German Field-Marshal von der Goltz, who had just taken supreme command of the Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia, perceived that unless it fell to an early assault the main task of his advanced troops would be to guard against a relief. Nur cd Din had four divisions at his disposal, and on the icth, nth and 24th he delivered unavailing onsets upon the narrow front that was not covered by the river. Then the siege became a blockade, part of the Turkish army moved down the Tigris to Sheikh Sa'd and 'All Gharbi, and the work of constructing formidable lines at Es Sinn on the right bank of the river, and athwart a defile on
