Verdun, and particularly on the northern front. On Jan. 20 Gen. Joffre sent Gen. de Castelnau there on a mission. The latter had been made chief of the staff of the group of French armies with the consent of the Government. After having stated that the resources placed at the disposal of Gen. Herr had been utilized judiciously and to the greatest degree possible, Gen. de Castelnau insisted that these resources should be increased; and this was sanctioned. From Feb. i onwards work was pushed forward actively, thanks to two reinforcing territorial divisions but it was very late. The general effect of the measures under- taken by the enemy made it clear that the attack would material- ize on the northern face of the salient on the right bank, between the village of Ornes and the Meuse. An army was concentrated to the rear of the threatened region: four army corps and con- siderable heavy artillery. The threat, however, on the Cham- pagne front was not yet dispelled, and it seemed imprudent to determine the position of these reserves prematurely by bringing them into the line. As it was foreseen that the only standard- gauge line of supply the line Verdun-St. Menehould would be cut in case of attack, the Verdun-Bar-le-Duc road was wid- ened to six and then to eight metres in order to allow the con- tinuous passage of two files of vehicles. Mensien, a small metre- gauge line, was improved so that the tonnage it could deal with was increased from 400 to 1,800 tons a day. These communica- tions indeed appeared to be extraordinarily inadequate in com- parison with the German network of lines, comprising 14 ordi- nary-gauge and 3 metre-gauge railways. They were, however, sufficient for the supply of the French troops.
General Herr had only a total of nine active divisions and six regiments of heavy artillery at his disposal on both banks of the Meuse as against nineteen German divisions, supported by a concentration of artillery hitherto unequalled.
The German line had been quiet for many months; to the rear great preparations had been observed, but in the front lines none of those approach works, considered as essential to the execution of an attack, had been made. At this period of the war, and for a long time after, it had been thought indispensable to place the attacking troops at an assault distance of between 200 and 250 metres, sheltered in parallel take-off trenches, in order to shorten as far as possible the distance to cover over open ground, at the same time avoiding " prematures " of their own artillery during the destruction of the enemy trenches and de- fences; the attacker had taken care not to reveal his intentions by digging these parallel trenches, which the French expected in order to be certain of a coming attack; he remained in his lines, at places 800 metres from the French trenches, because no defender would be in a fit state to fire after such an unheard-of bombardment as was being prepared; the French batteries destroyed or disorganized were no longer to be feared.
The German Attack and its Progress. On Feb. 21, at 07.15 hours (7:15 A.M.), on a cold dry day, the German bombardment began with great violence on both banks of the Meuse; it stretched over a front of 22 km. and was particularly intense on the northern front of the right bank.
Simultaneously, the destruction of the first and second posi- tions was carried out by the medium calibre guns (150 mm. 210 mm.) and the fortified works by the large calibre guns (280 mm., 305 mm., 380 mm. and 420 mm.). Six observation balloons and numerous aeroplanes directed the fire on this narrow zone. From 08.00 hours all telephonic communications were cut everywhere; many shelters fell in; the barbed wire disappeared; trenches and communication trenches were practi- cally levelled out by the afternoon. The craters made by the huge shells gave to all the countryside an appearance like the surface of the moon.
At 1 6. oo hours the intensity of the bombardment reached its zenith. At 16.45 the German infantry left their trenches be- tween the Hautmont wood and Herbebois, on a 4-km. front. Detachments of wire-cutters and pioneers, about 50 strong, preceded the successive waves which followed one another at a distance of 80 to too metres. The German officers had assured their men that they would penetrate the French positions with
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arms slung and without encountering resistance, as the artillery bombardment would have destroyed everything, both men and material obstacles. This assurance, however, had still to be realized. The French heavy artillery, although it had recently been reinforced, remained very inferior to that of the enemy and caused him little damage. The field artillery on the other hand opened fire at 13.00 hours, instead of commencing the bombard- ment in the morning as was laid down in the orders of the Army Group; it was increased at 16.00 hours and caused some losses when the attack was launched.
Some elements of the trenches were still in being with their defenders; groups came up out of the few shelters that were un- touched, and they fought bravely, although scarcely under cover; here and there a machine-gun came into action and inflicted considerable losses on the massed enemy; on such a restricted front, these local resistances were sufficient to delay the German attack considerably, very feebly on the left, but a little more strongly on the right. On the evening of the 2ist the first line trench was captured on the attack front, and the Germans gained a footing at certain points in the support trenches.
The following day, the 22nd, the German attack, led by the VII. Reserve Corps, the XVIII. and III. Active Corps, slowly followed up their success against the XXX. Corps under Chre- tien, when the 72nd Div. under Bafst lost the village of Haut- mont and the Caures wood, where, after a heroic resistance, they lost Col. Driant and Maj. Renouard.
Of the 14 battalions which he had in reserve Gen. Chretien had used 8, and he received a brigade, which nearly made up his losses. His sist Div. under Boullange lost a little ground, but its counter-attacks stopped the enemy.
However, on the 23rd the 72nd divisional commander, in- fluenced by the loss of Hautmont which thereby threatened his rear, evacuated the village of Brabant, which remained isolated on the Meuse; he received the order to retake it but could not succeed; the sist Div. lost the important position of Wavrille. The whole of the French first position was captured, and the line now ran through Samogneux, the Fosse wood and Ornes. It was really the second position, which was linked up with the first at Ornes.
The 24th witnessed the crumbling in of this line. Samogneux was taken before dawn, the Fosse wood during the day; Beau- mont, taken and retaken several times during the day of the 24th, fell during the night; and it became necessary to evacuate Ornes, outflanked on all sides. Then the enemy reached the heights of Talon and approached Douaumont. The situation appeared so serious that Gen. Herr asked permission to evacuate the Woevre plain and to draw back his front eastward to the Meuse heights; Gen. de Langle de Gary, commanding the Army Group, insisted on obtaining the sanction of Gen. Joffre for this withdrawal; he hoped to hold on on the front Talon heights- Louvemont-Douaumont-Vaux long enough to enable him to evacuate the right bank, which he thought to be inevitable. He even stopped on the left bank the elements of the XX. Corps which were reinforcing the XXX. Corps under Chretien.
It was now a question of deciding on the abandonment of Verdun. Should it be held at all costs and risk a disaster, if the bridges over the Meuse should come under enemy fire before the troops and artillery would have the time to cross them? Three times during the course of this sanguinary battle the same question arose, and three times Gen. Joffre settled the matter with the same calm and imperturbable tenacity. He replied to Gen. de Langle de Gary: " I approve in advance of the decisions that you will take as regards the withdrawal to the heights of the Meuse of the* troops dispersed in the Woevre, if you judge it to be indispensable; you are the sole judge of the necessities of the battle. But you must hold facing N. on the front between the Meuse and Woevre with all the means at your disposal. Use the whole of the XX. Corps without hesitation. To engage it is necessary in order to enable the reinforcing divi- sions to arrive; you must hasten their march to the Meuse."
General de Castelnau, his chief-of-staff of the army groups, left during the night, and after his arrival at the headquarters
