War Department that it was carried out with so much success; would have certainly been impossible but for the fact that American death casualties did not amount to much more than one hundred thousand, a comparatively small number compared with that of the British Empire, whose losses approximated to the enormous total of one million men. It is probable that the American War Department would have hesitated before undertaking a task even of the magnitude mentioned had it not been for the fact that, before a single American battalion had left the shores of the United States, a pledge had been given that no American soldier who died fighting for his country and for the liberties of nations should be left to lie on foreign soil except at the express wish of his next-of-kin.
Many Americans were taken from British military cemeteries, here they were buried under stress of battle with their British comrades-in-arms. It was hoped that the empty spaces left after removal of such French and American soldiers would be marked by memorials which would remind posterity how the armies of France, America and the British Commonwealth fought and fell together in the defence of a common ideal.
Those Americans left to rest in France were grouped together in three or four great cemeteries, the land being acquired by the French Government on behalf of the sister Republic under the law of 1915. The plan of construction of these cemeteries is based on the principle of uniform treatment of the graves, a principle which has for some considerable time found favour in America in the planning of cemeteries. Indeed the United States may justly claim to be the first nation to put this conception into practice, the most notable example being Arlington National Cemetery, where the men who died in the Civil War and in the Spanish-American War of 1898 lie buried. It is possible that the [conspicuous success with which Arlington Cemetery has been [designed had a share in influencing the Imperial War Graves [Commission in the construction of the British war cemeteries on somewhat similar lines.
WAR LOAN PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS. In connexion with
this account of publicity relating to war financing in Great
Britain, the article Liberty Loan Publicity Campaign and the
United States section of the article Savings Movement will
afford a broad view of the activities in these two countries.
Prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, Government loans in Great
Britain were subscribed by a very limited circle of large investors,
businesses and corporations. Publicity in connexion with
the floating of them began and ended with the issuing of a
prospectus, its publication in the Press, and its distribution by a
limited number of bankers and stockbrokers. In order, however,
to raise the vast sums of money required by the Government
for the prosecution of the war, other and far bolder publicity
methods had to be inaugurated during 1914-9. It was necessary
to appeal to a very much wider circle of subscribers — a circle
eventually no narrower than the whole population of the British
Islands — and to urge investment in War Loans as a patriotic
duty. The first attempts at the application of modern methods
of publicity to the flotation of War Loans were on a limited
scale, being hampered by official reluctance to depart from
traditional procedure and a prejudice against any lapse from official
“dignity.” A slight expansion of newspaper advertising, at first
not widely departing from mere “publication of prospectus”
advertising, and the use of posters displayed in the streets and
on hoardings, marked the beginning of a new state of things.
The work of the War Savings Committee from 1916 onwards,
together with news of the successful publicity work in the U.S.,
helped to reconcile British officialism to an increase of activity
in this direction.
By the time the so-called “Victory” Loan was floated, early in 1917, newspaper advertising had increased both in volume and effectiveness. Many more posters appeared on the hoardings. The services of local authorities were invoked, and public meetings were held, up and down the country, at which speakers drew attention to the country's pressing need of money and appealed openly for subscriptions. A great mass meeting in Trafalgar Square, held under the auspices of ministers of religion, was an outstanding publicity feature in connexion with the Victory Loan and was the forerunner of many similar gatherings.
It was, however, in connexion with the campaign for National War Bonds, which were first offered to the public in Sept. 1917, that organized publicity on behalf of British war-loan subscriptions displayed the fullest measure of its possibilities and achieved its greatest success. The National war Bonds were short-dated securities continuously on offer — in contrast to earlier loans the subscription lists for which had remained open only for some weeks. They were introduced by Mr. Bonar Law, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, in order to inaugurate a period of “continuous borrowing” to provide a method by which the public could subscribe each week the weekly cost, or more than the weekly cost of the war. It was hoped by this means to avoid the dislocation of the money market and the inflation of currency (due to borrowing from banks for purposes of subscription) which had been found to attend the previous “closing date” loans.
Despite attractive terms the subscriptions for National War Bonds for the first two or three weeks were distinctly disappointing. Starting at an exceedingly low weekly total the receipts rapidly fell, and it says much for the extent to which publicity methods had already justified themselves that in Nov. 1917 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, faced with the prospect of the failure of the whole new scheme of continuous borrowing, saw fit to appoint Sir George (then Mr.) Sutton, the chairman of the Amalgamated Press Ltd., as Director of Publicity for the War Bond campaign — with an entirely free hand as to methods employed, and, within very wide limits, a free hand as to expenditure. The result was a complete change, from the first week of Dec. 1917, when the War Bond publicity campaign could have been said to be really started.
The backbone of the campaign was undoubtedly newspaper and periodical advertising. This advertising was practically continuous, though very widely varied. The appeal of it was cast and recast in a hundred ways. It struck first the finance note, the self-interest note, the explanatory “see what you get and what security” note, and then the loftier note of patriotism, of service, of exhortation to duty. The advertising was intensely human, written to appeal not merely to business men but to the people at large. It reached its highest pitch of emotional appeal during the terrible spring of 1918 when the Germans, pushing far into the Allied lines, threatened Amiens, and the whole British nation hung breathless upon the march of events. During those dark weeks the War Bond advertising told, almost day by day, the story of England in terms of Belgium; pointing out the inevitable and hideous consequences of defeat, and urging the duty of supporting with money the brave men then fighting.
Another point to be noted about the press advertising was its topicality. Appropriate “copy” was actually kept standing for immediate publication in the event of certain contingencies such as a great victory, or (on the other side of the picture) the air-bombing of important British towns.
It was recognized that in order to sustain interest in War Bonds over a long period the steady appeal of the press advertising required reinforcing by periods of special activity. The necessary stimulus was obtained by the organization throughout the country of special “weeks” such as “Tank Weeks” — “Business Men's Week” — “War Weapons Weeks” — “Feed the Guns Weeks.” The main features of these were similar. They consisted essentially in the provision of some spectacular feature round which the appeal for subscriptions could centre. Tanks, for instance (then just newly invented), each with an officer and crew, took up their stand for a week at a time in the leading towns and cities. Officials of the Bank of England and of the Post Office accompanied the tanks, and very many million pounds' worth of bonds were sold by them.
The effect of the visit of a tank to a town was that for one week at least that town talked and thought of nothing but War Bonds. Local papers devoted columns to descriptions of the amount of business done, and local firms and business men vied with each other to subscribe the largest amounts.
