Page:EO 14023 Commission Final Report.pdf/165

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Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States


In evaluating jurisdiction stripping, we also differentiate among proposals based on the courts they would affect: Some proposals would restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court alone, while leaving lower court jurisdiction intact. Others would withdraw jurisdiction from all federal courts, including the district courts and courts of appeals, while leaving state court jurisdiction intact. Still others would withdraw jurisdiction not only from the Supreme Court, but also from all other federal and state courts. The merits and consequences of each type of proposal would differ, as we explain.

To organize our analysis, we begin by considering the goals of jurisdiction-stripping proposals and the proposals’ likely efficacy in achieving those goals. We then consider the consequences that successfully implementing the proposals might have for the functioning of the constitutional system.[46] We defer consideration of the constitutional issues that their enactment would present until Section I.C. We do not evaluate the specific policy goals that any jurisdiction-stripping proposal might serve.

1. Goals and Efficacy

Most prominent jurisdiction-stripping proposals today would shield specific, substantively defined issues, legislation, or policies from judicial review by the Supreme Court, by all federal courts, or by all federal and state courts. The goals of such proposals are overwhelmingly substantive in nature—to protect the particular laws in question from judicial invalidation. Nevertheless, proposals to curb judicial jurisdiction can also have more abstract goals, involving the redistribution of decisionmaking authority within our scheme of government. More specifically, some proponents of jurisdiction stripping regard it as a means of promoting greater democratic accountability by transferring power from the Supreme Court to more democratically responsive institutions.[47]

The Commission does not take a position on the desirability of any particular substantive proposal. These issues are ones over which Commissioners disagree. However, in analyzing the issue of jurisdiction stripping, we are skeptical that jurisdiction stripping could promote meaningful democratic accountability if Congress were to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court alone.

The reallocation of authority would be most dramatic if Congress were to strip jurisdiction from all courts, including state as well as federal courts, to entertain constitutional challenges to particular substantive legislation. In foreclosing all judicial review of legislation, Congress might be viewed as effectively claiming authority to determine that any covered statutes—such as one imposing a wealth tax or those banning abortions—were constitutionally valid.

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