'Our hold on Bengal and the Upper Provmces,' the Governor-General wrote to Lord Elgin on May 19th, 'depends upon the turn of a word — a look. An indiscreet act, or irritating phrase from a foolish commanding officer at the head of a mutinous or disaffected company may, whilst the present condition of things at Delhi lasts, lead to a general rising of the native troops in the Lower Provinces, where we have no European strength, and where an army in rebellion would have everything its own way for weeks and months to come. We have seen within the last few days what that way would be.'
'Here,' Lord Canning wrote, a few days later, to Sir J. Lawrence, with reference to the successful disarming of the Punjab regiments, 'from Calcutta up to Agra, we are in a very different position, and must play a very different game. With the exception of Dinápur, where there is one weak Queen's Regiment, not a single European soldier exists over a stretch of 750 miles. It would be impossible to take the Sepoys' arms from them; and, if it were done, we should not be much the better for it. There are no sufficient numbers of any other class in whose hands the arms could be placed with safety. All that can be done at present is to put on a bold front, and to collect strength as rapidly as possible. If the rebels at Delhi are crushed before the flame spreads, all will go well. Time is everything, and delay will severely try Cawnpur, Benares, and Oudh.'
The Delhi rebels, however, were not crushed and
