he objected, give rise to an impression that in our conflict with Russia we had grappled with too powerful an antagonist: it would reduce the European force below the standard recognised as safe in ordinary times. 'If, further,' he added, 'we should be called to despatch an army to the Persian Gulf ... then indeed I shall no longer feel, and can no longer express, the same confidence as before that the security and stability of our position in the East will remain unassailed.'
Despite this protest, two European regiments were transferred in 1854. They were never replaced; and when the Mutiny broke out, another important fraction of the European force was engaged in the Persian expedition.
One of Dalhousie's last acts in India had been to lay on his Council table a series of Minutes, the general purport of which was a reduction of Sepoy regiments, an increase of European regiments, an addition to the Irregular and Gúrkha forces, and of the European officers with native regiments. The warning fell on unheeding; ears: the Minutes were pigeon-holed, and never reached Parliament or the English public. Some of them were irretrievably mislaid. The subject dropped out of notice; and the outbreak of 1857 found the Government with an European force wholly inadequate to meet the barest requirements of the situation.
Dalhousie's protest did not stand alone. Sir Henry Lawrence in 1855 had written in no faltering terms of
