time. Even reputed quotations must be looked on with suspicion when they shew traces of comparatively modern phraseology. The mere attribution, however, of a fragment of legislation evidently old, to a fabulous or half-fabulous author should not invalidate the fragment itself, but is rather useful as giving us a traditional date, which may be correct, if not absolutely, at least relatively to other fragments. We may, for instance, disbelieve the very existence of Romulus, Numa or Tullus, but if we find three fragments attributed respectively to these three personages, we shall not, perhaps, be wrong in believing that there was at least some real ground for the fragments being placed at a very remote period and in a certain order of time.
As a secondary source of our knowledge on the present subject I regard the statements made by ancient authors about the first beginnings of Roman law. This latter source, though more plentiful, must be considered far inferior in purity to the former. Had they even possessed the means, writers of antiquity rarely possessed the inclination for the close critical enquiry into early history which has only reached its full developement in very modern times. It may seem strange to place our means so high in comparison with theirs, when so many works on history and antiquities have totally perished and others have only reached us in a mutilated condition. But, fragmentary as our authorities are, it must be remembered that they extend over the whole period of ancient intellectual activity, so that we have, at least in this respect, an advantage over all but the very latest ancient writers. In all points, too, connected with words or phrases which were obsolete at the Greek or Roman literary period, we are aided by the entirely modern science of comparative philology; while, with
