Page:Emile Vandervelde - Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution - tr. Jean Elmslie Henderson Findlay (1918).djvu/126

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Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution

at the prospect of a complete Austrian defeat, cut short the supplies and sent forward no more munitions. On the other hand, the inertia of the armies of Evert and of Kuropatkin, on his right, left him at the mercy of a German outflanking attack from the north. From that day he became convinced that the Government was in the hands of the pro-German clique, the centre of which was at Tsarskoie Selo, and from which a democratic revolution alone could save Russia.

Broussiloff did not hide from us either that this Revolution, while saving the country from the shame of irretrievable defeat, had created new difficulties for the armies. His account of the present situation in the army showed no pessimism, but on the other hand no great optimism. The material conditions were more favourable than they ever were for an offensive, he told us; there was abundance of war material, munitions, forage. But the discipline had been shaken; whole armies had been undermined by the Léninist propaganda, demoralized by "fraternizations." However, the group of armies of

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