798 A N A A N A empirically, as, for example, Bodies have weight, and these he called synthetic a posteriori; (2), such as were indeed necessary and universal, but added nothing to the content of the subject, as, for example, Bodies are extended, and these he called analytic. The general distinction of analytic and synthetic judg ments has a value apart from the specific character of those (synthetic) judgments in which Kant was most interested, and for the sake of which mainly it was fixed by him. Trained in the metaphysics of the Leibnitzo-Wolffian school, which marked off necessary judgments from those of simple fact without considering the kinds of necessity, Kant, when he came, by the route that can be traced in his earlier works, to apprehend the difference between merely logical analysis and real synthesis in thought, applied it almost exclusively to those judgments for which a character of necessity was claimed. He therefore noticed traces of the distinction in other thinkers, as Locke, only in so far as there was a suggestion also of this special reference. In truth, the general distinction, under a variety of expres sions, was familiar to both Hume and Locke, and it had already been drawn by the ancients. The old doctrine of the Predicables, in distinguishing the essential predication of genus, species, and difference from the non-essential predication of property and accident, plainly involves it; making besides, as between the last two predicables, a distinction which is very closely related to that drawn by Kant between the a priori and a posteriori synthetic. From the nominalistic point of view it is expressed by the difference of Verbal and Eeal propositions, as in Mill s Logic, and also often in Locke. While the synthetic judgment, as the name implies, brings together in thought two distinct concepts, each of which may be thought apart, the analytic judgment is merely the explication of a single concept in the form of a proposition. It is disputed what may be the ground of synthesis in different cases, but on all hands it is agreed that the logical Law of Contradiction is the controlling prin ciple for the explication of concepts already in the mind, however they may have come there. Now the explication may be made either completely or partially, according as the whole or part only of the intension of the concept is set forth : in other words, the aim may be to give the definition (where, in the full sense, that is possible), or simply to express any one or more of the contained attributes. Pro positions giving Buch partial explication are spoken of by Locke as "trifling;" and it is true that, if the concept is supposed already in the mind, no increase of knowledge is thereby obtained. This word, however, is unfortunate. Not to say that it is equally applicable to definitions, where the explication is only more complete, it tends to keep out of view the fact that analytic judgments, when not arbi trarily formed, are themselves or rather the concepts, of which they are the explications, are the permanent result or deposit of foregone real synthesis. So much, indeed, is this the case with concepts of things in nature what Mill calls natural kinds that in them a constant process of accretion is going on; new attributes, as they are discovered, being taken up into the essence, if they are at the same time characteristic and underived. Much also that is mere explication to one mind is real information to another. The terms Analytic and Synthetic, thus applied to judg ments, are so expressive in themselves that they have now come into general use. It is, however, a serious drawback to such an association of the terms, that it traverses what is otherwise the consistent use of the words analysis and synthesis in relation to each other. As the article ANALYSIS has shown, there is a synthesis which, as much as any analysis, is purely logical, and there is an analysis which, as much as any synthesis, is a means of real advance in knowledge. The terms Explicative (Erlaulerungsurtheile) and Ampliative (Erweiterungsurtheile], also employed by Kant, while not less expressive, are open to no such objec tion, (o. c. E.) AN AM, or ANNAM, also called COCHIN CHINA, a large empire of Asia, forming the eastern portion of the Indo- Chinese peninsula. See COCHIN CHINA. ANASTASIUS I., Emperor of Constantinople, was born at Dyrrhachium not later than 430 A.D. At the time of the death of Zeno (491), Anastasius, though only one of the guards (silentiarii) in the palace, held a very high character, and was raised to the throne of the Roman empire of the East, mainly through the influence of Ariadne, Zeno s widow, whom he married shortly after his accession. His reign, though afterwards disturbed by foreign and intestine wars and religious distractions, commenced aus piciously. He gained the popular favour by a judicious remission of taxation, and displayed great vigour and energy in administering the affairs of the empire. The principal wars in which Anastasius was engaged were those known as the Isaurian and the Persian. The former (492-8) was stirred up by the supporters of Longinus, the brother of Zeno, and resulted in Anastasius s favour; in the latter (502-5) he was signally defeated, but the provinces the Persians had won from him were restored on payment of a ransom. He also suffered defeat at the hands of the Goths of Italy, to check whose incursions he built the " Anastasian wall," extending from the Propontis to the Euxine. For the support he gave to the Eutychians, Anastasius was anathematised by Pope Symmachus. The latter years of his reign were troubled by revolts in Con stantinople, excited by his avarice and by his reputed heretical tendencies. He died in 518. ANASTASIUS II., Emperor, whose original name was Artemius, was raised to the throne of Constantinople by the voice of the senate and people in 713 A.D., on the deposition of Philippicus, whom he had served in the capacity of secretary. His territories being threatened both by sea and land, he sent an army under Leo the Isaurian, afterwards emperor, to defend Syria ; adopted wise and resolute measures for the defence of his capital; and equipped and despatched a formidable naval force, with orders not only to resist the approach of the enemy, but to destroy their naval stores. The fleet mutinied . at Rhodes, and proclaimed Theodosius, a person of low ex traction, emperor. After a six months reign, Constanti nople was taken by Theodosius; and Anastasius, who had fled to Nicsea, was compelled to submit to the new emperor, and, retiring to Thessalonica, became a monk (716). In 721 he headed a revolt against Leo, who had succeeded Theodo sius, and receiving a considerable amount of support, laid siege to Constantinople; but the enterprise failed, and Anastasius falling into Leo s hands, was put to death by his orders. ANATHEMA <(dva0e//.a, from dvcm $77/u, lit. anything offered up) is frequently used in classic Greek (in the form avdOrjfjLa) to denote things consecrated to the gods, and deposited in a temple. In the LXX. it is the equivalent of the Hebrew &"*, which denotes an offering devoted to God absolutely, and therefore, in the case of a living creature, put to death. The idea of destruction or perdition thus became associated with the word, which gradually lost its primary sense of consecration. In the New Testament it signifies separated from the church and accursed, and it became the technical term for a form of excommunication at an early date. ANATOLIA (from avaro-f), the east), a name first used under the Byzantine empire for the country east of the Bosphorus. In the form Anadoli, it denotes a modern Turkish division almost coincident with ASIA
MINOR, q.v.
