Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 13.djvu/204

192 INTERNATIONAL LAW of another, it may be a question whether it has lost or retained its independent status in international law. The proper test, according to Phillimore, is its capacity de facto to deal with other states in peace or war, without reference to the protecting state. States which have lost this capacity have been called semi-sovereign states. They have the organization of an independent nation, but are in practice subject to the rule of another stnte. The Ionian Islands under the English protectorate were in that position, and in the treaty of 1815 they are described as a single free and independent state, under the exclusive protection of Great Britain. A similar character attaches to some of the dependencies of Turkey. On the other hand, a large portion of the surface of the earth is occupied by com munities having neither the permanent territorial occupation nor the social coherence of civilized states, yet entering into such relations with them as require the recognition of some system of rules. A further question of the highest importance may arise when a portion of an existing state rises in rebellion and sets up a claim to independence. Here again the question is one of fact. If the rebels have succeeded in establishing a government, it is the right and duty of the nations to recognize the fact, and each nation must judge for itself whether the time for recognition has come. Premature recognition would be regarded as an aid to rebellion inconsistent with the rules of international law. The criterion suggested by practice and authority is whether the old government had ceased to contend in fact against the revolutionary state. But other nations are not bound to wait until the old government has itself recognized the independence of the new. Similar questions arise when the form of government in any country is changed by revolution, or when portions of one state are transferred by conquest to the dominion of another. When the new state of things is established in fact, no matter whether justly or unjustly, it must be recognized by other nations. With the question of recognition is intimately connected that of non-interference. Premature recognition of a strug gling rebellion would be regarded a.s a breach of the prin ciple of non-intervention, but to recognize the independence of an independent state is part of the same duty as to abstain from interfering with it when it has been established. Writers on international law lay it down as one of the fundamental principles of the science that one state has no right to interfere with the domestic affairs of another. In the formal arrangement of topics it generally appears as one of the necessary consequences flowing from the in dependence of nations, and Phillimore considers it a self- evident proposition for which it is unnecessary to cite authorities. Nevertheless the practice of nations forbids the doctrine to be stated without limitation. Interference has been sanctioned, according to Phillimore, either in the purely domestic concerns of a nation, or with respect to its foreign relations and territorial acquisitions. The first kind of interference has been justified on the plea of self- defence, as when the decree of the French Convention of 1792, promising aid to all peoples who wished to recover their liberty, was treated as a declaration of war on all existing constitutions. Interference to prevent effusion of blood, or put an end to a state of anarchy from which the interests of other nations necessarily suffer, has also been justified, as when England, France, and Kussia interfered between Turkey and its rebellious subjects in 1827. On the whole, the right of intervention has been discredited in international law, and the anomalous con dition of the Turkish empire has almost alone in recent times given occasion for its exercise. The ground that reversion ary rights of a particular family to the throne of a country justify foreign interference with legislative changes of the succession can no longer be maintained. Nor is it necessary to discuss any such pretended right as that of putting down new Governments which have established themselves by revolution. The same kind of interference is illustrated by the principle of the balance of power which is thus enunciated by Dr Woolsey that any European state may be restrained from pursuing plans of acquisitions or making- preparations looking toward future acquisitions which are judged to be hazardous to the independence and national existence of its neighbours. According to the same authority, it applies only to European states and their acquisitions in Europe, and does not extend to predominant power on the sea. It is not so much a rule of inter national law as a maxim of policy which has from time to time united European nations against the dangerous ambitions of one of their number. The " Monroe doctrine " of the United States is of a similar character, being directed against the interference of European states in the affairs of the American continent. The declaration that no European power can be permitted to acquire territory on the American continent is, according to Woolsey, not a principle of the national policy of the United States. Independent states are said to be equal in international law, because, says Phillimore, it is contrary to the nature of an independent state to be in servitude to another. The proposition negatives any claim of precedence on the part of one or more states in international rank, and asserts that all states equally are entitled to the benefit of inter national rules. No difference in constitution affects this equality, a republic being the equal of a kingdom, and a kingdom of an empire. Beyond this it can hardly be stretched. It is consistent with conventional inequalities in the reciprocal treatment of nations, and with the habitual recognition in Europe at least of the predominance of the Great Powers. Phillimore deduces from the principle of equality the following rights (1) the right to protect subjects resident in other countries, (2) the right to recog nition, (3) the right to external marks of honour, and (4) the right to enter into treaties. As to the first of these, it maybe laid down that a state has cause of complaint if its subjects in foreign countries are denied ordinary justice. States in relation to the territories occupied by them are treated on the footing of proprietors in law. As between nations each is the absolute owner of its dominions, and the principles applicable to their ownership are taken, as already said, from the Roman law of things. For example, the modes of acquiring territory in international law are said to be four. (1) The first is occupation of land not already occupied (res mi/lius). Mere discovery unaccompanied by beneficial use and occupation will not give a title. (2) The second is prescription or mere possession for a considerable length of time. Jurists on the whole are agreed in admitting this title, although they refrain from attempting to fix a period of prescription. These have been called original modes of acquisition, while secondary or derivative modes are (3) gift, purchase, or treaty, and (4) conquest in war. With reference to these distinctions it may be observed that the overruling consideration is actual possession as a matter of fact. Sovereignty exercised de facto over any territory makes it the territory of the sovereign state. This is a deduction of what has already been said on the subject of recognition, and the modes of acquisition here described would only be appealed to in default of such unequivocal possession. In former times a bull of the pope has been set up as a title, e.g., the famous bull of Alexander VI. granting to Spain all lands west of a north and south line drawn a hundred leagues west of the Azores. No such mode of acquisition would now be recognized even by Catholic states. In modern times the acquisition of territory is to some extent governed by the wishes of the inhabitants. As an abstract principle of international