Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 17.djvu/228

216 NAPOLEON [1810- thoroughly in earnest was he with his Continental system ; and indeed it is beyond dispute that great distress and discontent, nay, at last a war with the United States, were inflicted upon England by this policy. Dissolu- But the pressure of it was felt even more on the tion of Continent, and the ultimate cause of the fall of Napoleon the alii- wag ^-^ ^^ under the weight of the Continental sys- Tilsit tern the alliance of Tilsit broke down sooner than the resistance of England. That alliance had been seriously weakened by the Austrian marriage, and by Napoleon s refusal to give the guarantees which Russia required that Poland should never be restored. Indeed Napoleon had seemed to take pleasure in weakening it, but perhaps he had only desired to make it less burdensome to himself without destroying it. At the end of 1810 measures were taken on both sides which conveyed the impression to Europe that it was practically at an end. Alexander refused to adopt Napoleon s policy towards neutrals ; Napoleon answered by annexing Oldenburg, ruled by a duke of the Russian house ; Alexander rejoined by an ukase (December 31st) which modified the restrictions on colonial trade and heightened those on French trade. Invasion In 1811 the alliance of Tilsit gradually dissolves, of Napoleon s Russian expedition is hardly to be regarded as Russia. a f rea k; O f insane pride. He himself regarded it as the unfortunate effect of a fatality, and he betrayed throughout an unwonted reluctance and perplexity. The truth is, he could not now stop. Upon the Continental system he had staked everything. He had united all Europe in the crusade against England, and no state, least of all such a state as Russia, could withdraw from the system without practically joining England. Nevertheless we may wonder that, if he felt obliged to make war on Russia, he should have chosen to wage it in the manner he did, by an over whelming invasion. For an ordinary war his resources were greatly superior to those of Russia. A campaign on the Lithuanian frontier would no doubt have been unfavour able to Alexander, and might have forced him to concede the points at issue. Napoleon had already experienced in Spain the danger of rousing national spirit. It seems, how ever, that this lesson had been lost on him, and that he still lived in the ideas which the campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1807 had awakened, when he had occupied Vienna and Berlin in succession, overthrown the Holy Roman Empire, and conquered Prussia. He makes a dispute about tariffs the ground of the greatest military expedition known to authentic history ! In this we see a stroke of his favourite policy, which consisted in taking with great suddenness a measure far more decisive than had been expected ; but such policy seems here to have been wholly out of place. He was perhaps partly driven to it by the ill-success of his diplomacy. War with France meant for Russia sooner or later alliance with England, but Napoleon was not able to get the help of Turkey, and Sweden joined Russia. Turkey had probably heard of the partition-schemes which were agitated at Tilsit, and was also influenced by the threats and promises of England. Sweden suffered grievously from the Continental system, and Bernadotte, who had lately become crown prince, and who felt that he could only secure his position by procur ing for Sweden some compensation for the recent loss of Finland, offered his adhesion to the power which would help him in acquiring Norway. Napoleon declined to rob his ally, Denmark, but Alexander made the promise, and Sweden was won. Against Russia, Sweden, and England (a coalition which formed itself but tardily) Napoleon assembled the forces of France, Italy, and Germany, and hoped to win, as usual, by the rapid concentration of an overwhelming force. The army with which he invaded Russia consisted of somewhat more than 600,000 men, the French troops mainly commanded by Davoust, Oudinot, and Ney, the Italian troops by Prince Eugene, the Poles by Poniatowski, the Austrian contingent (33,000 men) by Schwarzenberg, the remaining German troops by Gouvion St Cyr, Reynier, Vandamme, Victor, Mac- donald (who had the Prussian contingent), and Augereau. When we consider that the war of the Peninsula was at the same time at its height, and that England was now at war with the United States, we may form a notion of the calamitous condition of the world ! Russia had been easily defeated at Austerlitz and Friedland, where it fought far from home for a cause in which it was but slightly interested. Against an invasion it was as invincible as Spain, being strengthened by a profound national religion and perfect loyalty to the Government; in addition it had the strength of its vast extent, its rigorous climate, and the half-nomad habits of its people. By his prodigious preparations Napoleon provoked a new national war under the most difficult circumstances, and yet he appears to have desired peace and to have advanced most reluctantly. His campaign runs the same course as against Austria in 1805 and 1809. There is the successful advance, the capture of the fortress (Smolensk), the great victory (at Borodino), the entry into the capital (Moscow) ; but of all this no result. No negotiation follows, and Napoleon suddenly finds him self helpless, as perhaps he would have done in 1805 and 1809, had the enemy shown the same firmness. On May 16, 1812, he arrived with Marie Louise at Dresden, where for the last time he appeared as king of kings, the emperor of Austria, the king of Prussia, a multitude of German sovereigns, Metternich, and Hardenberg paying court to him. On the 28th he set out again and travelled by Glogau, Thorn, Dantzic, Konigsberg, Gumbinnen, to Wilkowyski, where he arrived on June 21st. On the 24th the mass of the army passed the Nieinen at Kovno, and on the 28th Napoleon entered Vilna, which was evacuated by the Russians. Here he remained till July 16th. In this long delay, as well as in other circumstances, the unwonted perplexity of his mind appears. Alexander, who has by this time gained greatly in decision of character, refuses to negotiate while the enemy stands on Russian territory ; Napoleon in conversation with Balacheff shows an almost pathetic desire for an amicable arrangement. He is embarrassed again when a deputation from Warsaw, where a diet had met, bids him only say that " Poland exists, since his decree would be for the world equivalent to the reality." This word he declines to say, alleging his obligations to Austria. From his conversations with Narbonne (Villemain, Souvenirs) we find that he had deliberately considered and rejected what we may call the rational mode of waging war with Russia, that is, through the restoration of Poland. He admitted that he might indemnify Austria and, if necessary, Prussia else where, but he argued that he could not afford to open the floodgates of republicanism : " Poland must be a camp, not a forum." He had in fact perhaps mainly since his second marriage come to regard himself as the representative of legitimacy against the Revolution. It was thus with his eyes open that he preferred the fatal course of striking at Moscow. His judgment was evidently bewildered by the successes of 1805 and 1806, and he indulges in chimerical imaginations of delivering Europe once for all from the danger of barbaric invasion. It is to be observed that he seems invariably to think of the Russians as Tartars! In relating this war we have to beware of national exaggerations on both sides. On Napoleon s side it is absurdly said that he was only vanquished by winter, whereas it is evident that he brought the winter upon