Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 17.djvu/230

218 NAPOLEON only to be postponed for a year. Instead of this lie delayed five weeks in Moscow, and then complained of Retreat the Russian winter! After planning a demonstration from on St Petersburg, weighing Daru s scheme of wintering Moscow. | n Moscow (which he called " un conseil de lion "), and wait ing in vain for the czar s submission, he set out on October 18th after blowing up the Kremlin. He marched south ward to Kaluga, hoping to make his way through a richer and unexhausted country. But while his force had dwindled the Russian had increased. Peace with Sweden had released a Russian force in Finland ; peace with Turkey released the army of the Danube; meanwhile levies were proceeding through the whole empire. Napoleon s plan was frustrated by a check he received at Malojaro- slavetz, and he had to turn northward again and return as he had come. He reached Smolensk on November 9th, when he might have been at Vilna. He marched by Orcza to the Berezina, which he struck near Borisoff. Here Tchitchagoff at the head of the Danube army con fronted him, and two other Russian armies were approach ing. Napoleon on his side was joined by what remained of the corps of Oudinot and Victor, who had held the line of the Dwina. But what was the army of Napoleon which was thus reinforced ? In July it had consisted of more than 250,000 men. It had suffered no decisive defeat, and yet it amounted now only to 12,000; in the retreat from Moscow alone about 90,000 had been lost. The force which now joined it amounted to 18,000, and Napoleon s star had still influ ence enough to enable him to make his way across the Berezina, and so escape total ruin and captivity. But December came on, and the cold was more terrible than ever. On the evening of December 6th a miserable throng, like a crowd of beggars, tottered into Vilna. The corps of Macdonald, Reynier, and Schwarzenberg (among whom were included the Austrian and Prussian contingents) had escaped destruction, having been posted partly on the Polish frontier partly in the Baltic provinces. For these we may deduct 100,000 from the total force ; it then appears that half a million had perished or dis appeared. They had perished not by unexpected cold ; " the cold had but finished the work of dissolution and death almost accomplished by the enemy, by hardship, and especially by hunger" (Charras) ; nor is cold unusual in Russia in November ! Napoleon s error was one which may be traced as clearly in the campaigns of 1805 and 1806, the error of making no provision whatever for the case of ill-success or even success less than complete. It was now the twentieth year that Europe was tearing itself to pieces. For some years past the pretence of Revolution ary principles had been given up. There was now no pretext for war except the so-called maritime tyranny of England ; but yet the magnitude of wars had increased beyond all measurement. The campaign of 1812 left every thing in civilized history far behind it. All the abuses of the old monarchy and all the atrocities of the Revolution put together were as nothing compared to this new plague, bred between the Revolution and the old monarchy, having the violence of the one and the vain glory of the other, with a barbarous destructiveness peculiar to imperialism superadded. But what was Napoleon s position ? Any Government but the strongest would have sunk under such a blow, but Napoleon s Government was the strongest, and at its strongest moment. Opposition had long been dead ; public opinion was paralysed ; no immediate rising was to be feared. Should he then simply take the lesson home, and make peace with Alexander ? This was impossible ; he must efface the disaster by new triumphs. But, as this was evident to all, Alexander could not but perceive that he must not lose a moment, but must hasten forward and rouse Germany before Napoleon should have had time to levy a new army. 1813 must be filled with a war in Germany, as 1812 with the war in Russia. Napoleon left the wreck of his army at Smorgoni on December 5 (as he had left his Egyptian army thirteen years before), travelling in a carriage placed upon a sledge and accompanied by Caulaincourt and Duroc. He had an interview with Maret outside Vilna, and then travelled to Warsaw, where he saw his ambassador De Pradt, who has left an account of his confused talk. Here, as in the famous 29th bulletin, published a little after, we observe that he consoles himself for the loss of his army by reflect ing that his own health was never better he kept on repeating this. Then he said, " From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but a step " ; for the retreat from Moscow strikes him as ridiculous From Warsaw he passed to Dresden, where he saw his ally the king of Saxony, and wrote letters to the emperor of Austria and to the king of Prussia. He then made his way by Erfurt and Mainz to Paris, where he arrived on December 18th. The bulletin had appeared two days before. He had said to De Pradt that he intended to raise Wars of 300,000 men and be on the Niemen again in the spring. 1813-14. The first part of this intention he fulfilled, for in April he reappeared in the field with 300,000 men ; but the campaign was fought not on the line of the Niemen, nor of the Vistula, nor of the Oder, and he had to fight a battle before he could even reach the Elbe. For a great event took place less than a fortnight after his arrival in Paris, the defection of the Prussian contingent under York from the grand army ; this event led to the rising of Prussia against Napoleon. York s convention with the Russians is dated December 30th. On January 22, 1813, Stein appeared at Konigsberg and procured the assembling of the estates of East Prussia, in which assembly the Prussian landwehr was set on foot. On February 27th he con cluded for the czar the treaty of Kalisch with Prussia, by which the old Coalition of 1806 may be said to have been revived. Prussia now rushed to arms in a wholly new spirit, emulating Spain and Russia in devotion, and adding to devotion an intelligence peculiar to herself. At the same time measures were taken to break up the Confedera tion of the Rhine. Tettenborn cleared the French out of the northern departments in March ; Saxony too passed into the hands of the allies, and it was hoped that the king himself might be induced to follow the example of the king of Prussia. But April came, and Napoleon took the field again. By rapidity and energy he was still able to take the offensive. Though Russia and Prussia were now as Spain, yet the process of calling out and drilling their population was only just begun, and it proceeded slowly. Their united available force at the opening of the campaign scarcely exceeded 100,000 men. Austria and the middle states did not abandon Napoleon. With tact and with judicious concession he might yet retrieve his position ; perhaps no one, as yet, had begun to think of his fall. He left Paris for Mainz on April 15th. His object was Saxony, where Dresden, the scene of his last display of omnipotence less than a year ago, was now the residence of the czar and the king of Prussia united against him. Eugene was maintaining himself on the lower Saale with an army of about 70,000 men, and Napoleon was to march by way of Erfurt to join him. Between Erfurt, Bamberg, and Mainz he had by this time about 150,000 men, troops indeed without discipline and with imperfect drill, youths, the last hope of France, but well officered and not wanting in the enthusiasm which his name still inspired. There was, however, a serious deficiency of cavalry. Mean-