Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/144

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130 A N T A N T proceeded on the principle, that being spiritual their nature could not be corrupted whatever their moral conduct might be. Gnostic Antinomianism seemSj therefore, to have been in this respect analogous to that of the High Calvinists, some of whom went so far as to maintain that an elect person did not sin -even when he committed actions in themselves wicked. Such were the Antinomians in England during the Protectorate. A doctrine so extreme, and sanctioning so unmistakably an immoral life, is to be carefully distin guished from the Antinomianism combated by Luther, which was a matter of theory not necessarily affecting con duct. It is not easy to apprehend or to state with clearness the precise views of Agricola as to the relation between the Christian and the moral law. His own statements were more than once modified or retracted in the course of discussion, and there can be no doubt that Luther made him responsible for opinions which he did not hold. The exaggeration characteristic of all controversies seems to have prevailed in this case to an unusual extent on both sides, and neither disputant should always be taken literally at his word, whether he speaks for himself or for his opponent. It was probably a desire to establish Luther s negation of the Eoman Catholic doctrine of good works on some firm ground of principle, that first led Agricola to insist as he did on the essential incompatibility between the law and the gospel. The law of Moses, he taught, was for the Jews alone, and was not a rule of life to Christians, who might with safety altogether neglect it. On the other hand, he never denied that the Christian was under a moral govern ment .with an adequate sanction, which laid him under obligation to lead a holy life. What he maintained was that the New Testament furnished all that was necessary for impulse and guidance in the path of Christian duty, riot in the form of positive precepts so much as of principles and motives. Thus explained, the difference between the orthodox and AgricolaV party reduces itself within a com paratively narrow compass, though, after the fullest explana tion, it remains a real difference and a standing subject of controversy. ANTINOMY is the word employed by Kant, in the Critical Philosophy, to mark the inevitable conflict or con tradiction into which, according to his view, speculative reason falls with itself, when it seeks to conceive the complex of external phenomena, or nature, as a world or cosmos. Literally the word means a conflict or opposition of laws ( Widerstreit der Gesetze). . It is used by Kant both in a generic and in a specific sense; the fate that lies upon the speculative endeavour of human reason taking the form of four special contradictions. For the generic sense Kant also has the word Antithetic, each antinomy being set forth in the shape of thesis and antithesis, with corresponding demonstrations, the perfect validity of which, in all cases, he most positively guarantees. The conflicting propositions, or the cosmological ideas involved in them, are intimately, though somewhat obscurely, related to the four heads of categories of the understanding in the Kantian system, but this is not the place to enter into such details. Expressed in the shortest form, the theses run thus : The world (1) is limited in space and time, (2) consists of parts that are simple, (3) includes causality through freedom, (4) implies the existence of an absolutely necessary being. To these answer the antitheses : The world (1) is without limits in space or time, (2) consists of parts always composite, (3) includes no causality but that of natural law, (4) implies the existence of no absolutely necessary being. The theses were taken by Kant from the speculative cosmology of the Wolffian school ; the antitheses are the not less dogmatic assertions made or suggested by empirical thinkers. Since, according to Kant, equally valid arguments can be adduced on each side, while, as mutually contradictory in their dogmatic sense, the two sets of propositions cannot both be true, it is plain that reason must have gone beyond its powers in seeking for a speculative knowledge of that which can be given in no experience. But the function of a true philo sophy does not stop short with the detection of this internal strife of speculative reason ; the strife must be composed, and Kant^holds that none but his own critical doctrine is equal to the task. The first two antinomies he overcomes by showing that theses and antitheses, when critically understood of mere phenomena, are both alike false ; the others, by showing that the opposed members, when under stood, again critically, of noiimena and phenomena respec tively, may both be true. This amounts to saying, that in neither of the two sets of cases (though in different ways) is the contradiction real, however really it has been intended by the opposing partizans, or must appear to the mind without critical enlightenment. It is wrong, therefore, to impute to Kant, as is often done, the view that human reason is, on ultimate subjects, at war with itself, in the sense of beizig impelled by equally strong arguments towards alternatives contradictory of each other. Hamilton s Law of the Conditioned that all positive knowledge lies between two extremes, neither of which we can conceive as possible, but yet, as mutual contradictories, the one or other of which we must recognise as necessary while suggested by the Kantian doctrine of the Antinomy of Pure Eeason, is dis tinctly at variance with it. In the realm of phenomenal experience, actual or possible, when it is properly conceived, Kant allows of no conflict ; and, though he denies that we can have speculative knowledge of a realm transcending experience, he is satisfied of this at least, that knowledge of the one realm may go forward without prejudice to moral conviction of another. (G. c. E.) ANTINOUS, a beautiful youth, who was page to the emperor Hadrian, and greatly beloved by him. After his mysterious death by drowning in the Nile (130 A.D.), Hadrian for whose sake, according to one account, he had offered himself a voluntary victim to destiny caused the most extravagant respect to be paid to his memory by ceremony and monument. Not only were cities called after him, medals struck with his effigy, and statues erected to him in all parts of the empire, but he was raised to the rank of the gods, temples were built for his worship, festivals celebrated in his honour, and oracles delivered in his name. The cities that showed most zeal for the new divinity were Bithynium (Antinoopolis) his birth-place, Besa (Antinoopolis) in Egypt, Mantinea in Arcadia, and Athens. It was in Athens that his greatest festivals were held the AvTu/deia & acrret (in the city) and the AvTivoeta eV EAevo-tvi (at Eleusis). A remarkable impulse was given to the art of sculpture by the endeavour to produce an idealised representation of the deified page. We still possess a colossal bust in the Vatican, a bust in the Louvre, a bas-relief from the Villa Albani, a statue in the Capitol, another in Berlin, another in the Lateran, and many more. The medals with his head are equally nume rous. (Levezow, Ueber den Antinous ; 0. MuTler, Hand- buck der Arcluiologie ; Muller- Wieseler, Denkmaler der alien Kunst.) ANTIOCH ( AvTio X a), a city in Syria.Jong. 36 10 E., lat. 36 11 N., described as "Epidaphnes" (rj CTJ-I Aa^v???, or 7Tt Aa^vfl), or as "on the Orontes," to distinguish it from the fifteen other Greek towns which, like itself, owed their foundation to Seleucus Nicator, and their names to his father Antiochus. While the wide-spread notoriety of Daphne, with its beautiful grove, compared to the vale of Tempe, and with its extraordinary excesses of pleasure, rendered it available as a local designation for Antioch, the river Orontes also seems to have served the

same purpose with more than usual interest, owing, per-