ductions, it is certain that the Ciceronian phrase of the liberal arts, the ingenuoiis arts, both in Latin and its deri vatives or translations in modern speech, has been used currently to denote the sciences themselves, and not merely the disciplines instrumental to them. The trivium and the quadrivi^(,m (grammar, logic, and rhetoric geometry, astro nomy, music, and arithmetic) have been habitually called arts, when some of them have been named in that sense in which they mean not arts but sciences, " only contem plating things in the mind." In the German language particularly the words Art and Science have in general been loosely interchanged. The etymology of the word for Art secured a long continuance for this ambiguity. Kunst was employed indiscriminately in both the senses of the primitive Ich kann, to signify what I know, or Science, and what I can do, or Art. It was not till the end of the 17th century that a separate word for Science, the modern Wissenschaft, came into use. On the other hand, the Greek word TexvT;, with its distinct suggestion of the root sig nification to make or get, acted probably as a safeguard against this tendency. The distinction between rexy?], Art or practice, and eTricrr^yu,?;, knowledge or Science, is ob served, though not systematically, in Greek philosophy. But for our present purpose, that of making clear the true rela tion between the one conception and the other, further quotation is rendered superfluous by the discussion the subject has received at the hands of the modern writer already quoted. Between Art, of which we. practise the rules, and Science, of which we entertain the doctrines, Mr Mill establishes the difference in the simplest shape, by pointing out that one grammatical mood is proper for the conclusions of Science, and another for those of Art. Science enunciates her conclusions in the indicative mood, whereas " the imperative is the characteristic of Art, as distinguished from Science." And as Art utters her con clusions in her own form, so she supplies the substance of
her own major premise.
"Every art has one first principle, or general major premise, not borrowed from science, that which enunciates the object aimed at, and affirms it to be a desirable object. The builder s art assumes that it is desirable to have buildings ; architecture (as one of the fine arts) that it is desirable to have them beautiful and imposing. The hygienic and medical arts assume, the one that the preservation of health, the other that the cure of disease, are fitting and desirable ends. These are not propositions of science. Propositions of science assert a matter of fact an existence, a co-existence, a succession, or a resemblance. The propositions now spoken of do not assert that anything is, but enjoin or recommend that something should be. They are a class by themselves. A proposition of which the predicate is expressed by the words ought or should be is generically different from one which is expressed by is or will be."
And the logical relation of Art and Science, in other words,
the manner of framing the intermediate member between
the general major premise of Art and its imperative conclu
sion, is thus defined:—
"The Art [in any given case] proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the Science. The Science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to Art with a theorem of the causes and combinations by which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of the premises, therefore, which Art supplies, is the original major premise, which asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable. Science, then, lends to Art the proposition (obtained by a series of inductions or deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these premises Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable, and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept The grounds, then, of every rule of Art are to be found in the theorems of Science. An Art, or a body of Art, consists of the rules, together with as much of the speculative propositions as comprises the justification of these rules. The complete Art of any matter includes a selection of such a portion from the Science as is necessary to show on what conditions the effects, which the Art aims at producing, depend. And Art in general consists of the truths of Science arranged in the most convenient order for practice, instead of the order which is most convenient for thought. Science groups and arranges its truths so as to enable us to take in at one view as much as possible of the general order of the universe. Art, though it must assume the same general laws, follows them only into such of their detailed consequences as have led to the formation of rules of conduct, and brings together from parts of the field of Science most remote from one another, the truths relating to the production of the different and heterogeneous causes necessaiy to each effect which the exigencies of practical life require to be produced. " (Mill s Logic, vol. ii. pp. 542-549.)
The whole discussion may be summed up thus. Science consists in knowing, Art consists in doing. What I must do in order to know, is Art subordinate to or concerned in Science. What I must know in order to do, is Science subordinate to or concerned in Art.
Art, then, is defined by two broad distinctions : first, its popular distinction from Nature; and next, its practical and scientific distinction from Science. Both of these distinc tions are observed in the terms of our definition given above. Within the proper limits of this definition, the conception of Art, and the use of the word for it, have undergone sundry variations. These variations correspond to certain vicissitudes or developments in the order of historical facts and in society. It remains very briefly to consider the chief of these. The requirements of society, stimulating the in genuity of its individual members, have led to the invention of arts and groups of arts, constantly progressing, with the progress of civilisation, in number, in complexity, and in resource. The religious imagination of early societies, who find themselves in possession of such an art or group of arts, forgets the history of the invention, and assigns it to the inspiration or special grace of some god or hero. So the Greeks assigned the arts of agriculture to Triptolemus, those of spinning and navigation to Athene, and of music to Apollo. At one stage of civilisation one art or group of arts is held in higher esteem, another at another. In societies, like most of those of the ancient world, where slaves were employed in domestic service, and upon the handicrafts supplying the immediate utilities of life food, shelter, and clothing these constituted a group of servile arts. The arts of husbandry or agriculture, on the other hand, have alternately been regarded as servile and as honourable according as their exercise has been in the hands of a subject class, as under feudal institutions, or, as under the Roman republic, of free cultivators. Under feudal institutions, or in a society in a state of permanent war, the allied arts of war and of government have been held the only honourable class. In commercial states, like the republics of Italy, the arts of gain, or of pro duction (other than agricultural) and distribution, have made good their title to equal estimation and greater power beside the art of captains. But among peaceful arts, in dustries, or trades, some have always been held to be of higher and others of lower rank ; the higher rank being assigned to those that required larger operations, higher training, or more thoughtful conduct, and yielded ampler returns the lower rank to those which called for simple manual exercise, especially if such exercise was of a dis agreeable or degrading kind. In the cities of Italy, where both commerce and manufactures were for the first time organised on a considerable scale, the name arte, Art, was retained to designate the guilds or corporations by which the several industries were exercised ; and, according to the nature of the industry, the art was classed as higher or lower (maggiore and minore).
from positive requirements, and supply what are strictly
utilities, in societies, not excluding the art of war, at least
