Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 20.djvu/529

him at least that.the first extant definition is due. He defines the enthymeme as a species of syllogism, namely, as "a syllogism from probabilities and signs" (e etWrwi/ Kal (rri/jietwv). The "probability" (elic6s) is a general proposition, expressing that which usually happens, as, "wise men are usually just." The ' ' sign " (ai]fj.iov) is a particular proposition, as, " Socrates is just. " The "sign" may be fallible or infallible. If we say, "wise men are just ; for Socrates was wise and just," this is an enthymeme from a fallible "sign," the implied syllogism being "Socrates was wise; Socrates was just (<n)nt'iov) ; .'. all wise men are just"; and here the "sign" is, in Aristotle's phrase, "as a particular to .i universal," because from the one case of Socrates we draw an inference about all men. If, again, we say, "Here is a sign that he is ill he is feverish"; our enthymeme is using an infallible sign, the syllogism being, "All who are feverish are ill; he is feverish (<rr)juetoi>) ; . '. he is ill." Here, again, the " sign " is " as a particular to a universal." AA 7 heu the "sign" is thus infallible, it is properly called tekmerion (reK/j.^piov), the matter having been demonstrated and concluded (ireirtpacrfjievov) "for tekmar and peras mean the same thing ('limit') in the old language." Sometimes, again, the fallible sign is "as universal to particular," e.g., " Here is a sign that he has a fever he breathes quick," the syllogism being, ' ' Feverish men breathe quick ; he breathes quick (cr-r]fji.flov} ; . '. he has a fever," where a particular cause is unsoundly inferred from an effect (the "universal") which might have other causes. AYhen Aristotle thus describes the enthymeme, or rhetorical syllogism, as dealing with "probabilities" and "signs," he is describing its ordinary or characteristic materials, qua rhetorical syllogism. He does not mean to say that rhetoric cannot use syllogisms formed with other material. It would be hardly need- ful to point this out, were it not that, in spite of his own clear words, his meaning has sometimes been misunderstood. "The premises of rhetorical syllogisms," he says, "seldom belong to the class of necessary facts. The subject matter of judgments and deliberations is usually contingent ; for it is about their actions that men debate and take thought ; but actions are all cpntingent, no one of them, so to say, being necessary. And results which are merely usual and contingent must be deduced from premises of the same kind, as necessary results from necessary premises. It follows that the propositions from which enthymemes are taken will be sometimes necessarily true, but more often only contin- gently true. " Among the materials of the enthymeme, the "sign " which is infallible (the enj/teroi/ which is also a TtKfiApiov) is so because it is to some necessary truth as part to whole. Aristotle did not regard the suppression of one premiss in the statement as essential to the enthymeme. The syllogism, of which the enthymeme is merely a kind, was regarded by him "not in re- lation to the expression " ( ou irpos rbv ea> Koyov), but to the process in the mind (aa irp<>s ri>i> ev TTJ ^v^rj yov, Anal. Post., i. 10). As Sir W. Hamilton has justly said, he could not then have intended to distinguish a class of syllogisms by a verbal accident. The distinction of the rhetorical syllogism, in Aristotle's view, was in its matter, not in its form. This is, indeed, made sufficiently clear by his own remark that the enthymeme may "often" be more concisely stated than the full, or normal, syllogism (Khet., i. 2). There is obviously no reason why the rhetorical reasoner should not state both his premisses, if he finds it convenient or effective to do so. Since, however, one of the premisses is often left to be mentally supplied, some of the later writers on rhetoric came to treat this as part of the essence of the enthymeme. It was then that the word dreAijs was interpolated after <rvoytfffj.6s in Aristotle, Analyt. Prior., ii. 27, where the enthymeme is defined as avXXoyifffjibs e' ej/c0Ta>j/ Kal <rrfj.eitav. 1 Hence Quintilian says of the enthymeme (v. 10), "alii rhetoricum syllogismum, alii imperfedum syllogismum vocant" ; hence, too, Juvenal's "curium enthymema." The other branch of the "logical proof" in rhetoric corresponds to the induction of strict logic, and consists in giving the semblance of inductive reasoning by the use of one or two well-known examples. As Aristotle calls the enthymeme a rhetorical syllo- gism, so he calls the example (irapd5eiyfj.a) ' ' a rhetorical induction. " Thus if a man has asked for a body-guard, and the speaker wishes to show that the aim is a tyranny, he may quote the ' ' examples " of Dionysius and Pisistratus. Aristotle next distinguishes the "universal " from the ' ' special " topics, or commonplaces of rhetoric. The word r6itns, "place," means in this context " that place in which a proposition of a given kind is to be sought." The r6irot, then, are classifications of propositions and arguments which rhetoric makes beforehand, with a view to readiness in debate. Cicero well illustrates the phrase" As it is easy to find hidden things when the place has been pointed out and marked, so, when we want to track out an argument, we ought to know the places, as Aristotle has called these seats, abodes, as it were, from which arguments are drawn. 1 On this interpolation, see Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 154. 511 So a commonplace, or topic, may be defined as the abode of an argument (licet definire locum esse argumenti scdem ; Cic., Topica, ii. 7). So elsewhere he describes the roirof of rhetoric as "regiones iritra quas venere et pervestiges quod quseras" "haunts in which one may hunt and track out the object of quest" (De Oral., ii. 34). The "universal commonplaces" (KOIVOI universal T(5iroi) are general heads of argument applicable to all subjects and whatsoever as, e.g., on the "possibility" or "impossibility" of special, anything. The special commonplaces (-r6iroi -rtav fiSuv, Mhet., ii. 22, more briefly called etSri) are those which are drawn from special branches of knowledge, as from politics, ethics, &c. Here Aristotle observes that the more a rhetorician enters on the subject-matter of any particular science the more will he tend to pass out of the domain which properly belongs to the art of rhetoric. In that domain three provinces are distinguished. Deliber- The three ative rhetoric (ffvp.^ovevriKj]} is concerned with exhortation or kinds of dissuasion, and with future time; its "end" (re'Aos) that which rhetoric, it keeps in view, or its standard is advantage (or detriment) to the persons addressed. Forensic rhetoric (5i/c<wKV?) is concerned with accusation or defence, and with time past ; its standard is justice or injustice. Epideictic rhetoric the ornamental rhetoric of "display" (^mSei/cTi/dj) is concerned with praise or blame, and usually with time present ; its standard is honour or sjhame. 1. Lotus begin with deliberative rhetoric, says Aristotle, and see Delibera what things a deliberative speaker ought to know. The subjects tive. with which, in a public assembly, he will have to deal are mainly these five : (1) finance, (2) foreign war, (3) home defence, (4) commerce, (5) legislation. Under all these heads, he ought to be provided with some ettir}, or special commonplaces. Further, all his suasion or dissuasion has reference to the happiness of those whom he addresses. Hence he must be acquainted with the popular notions of happiness which are actually prevalent. Here Aristotle gives a series of popular definitions of happiness, and a list of the elements which are generally regarded as constituting it. A similar analysis of "good" (ayaBdv) follows. The scientific spirit of the rhetoric is strongly accentuated by the unscientific character of these and subsequent analyses. Aristotle never forgets that his rhetorician wants to know, not what a thing is, but what it is generally thought to be. There is nothing of cynicism or sarcasm in all this. He is simply going through his prescribed task. He is making rhetoric, as such, into a method. But suppose the question arises "Of two good things which is the better ?" Our deliberative speaker must be able to treat the ' ' universal commonplace " of degree GuaAAoj/ al ^TTOJ/). Then, he must also know something about the chief forms of government, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, not as they are or should be, but as they are popularly conceived. 2. The ornamental rhetoric (firiSftK-riK-li), which is taken next, Epideic- is somewhat briefly dismissed. It might be conjectured, in ex- tic. planation of its place in the treatment we should have expected it to come third that Aristotle was the first writer who recog- nized it as an independent kind, and that he viewed it as an off- shoot from the deliberative branch. The epideictic speaker must know what most men think ' ' honour "or " shame, " ' ' virtue " or ' ' vice. " At this point a verbal distinction of some interest occurs : praise (eiraivos) implies moral approbation ; but an "en- comium" (e'yKcfyiioc) is given to " achievements " (epya) as such. The most generally useful " topic " for the ornamental speaker is avfra-is (magnifying), as the rhetorical induction (irapdSfiyft.a) most helps the deliberative speaker, and the rhetorical syllogism (tv6vfj.n/jia) is most useful to the forensic. 3. In forensic rhetoric, we must begin by analysing injustice. Forensic. And first, "What are the motives and aims of wrong-doing?" Actions are either voluntary from habit, reason, anger, lust, or in- voluntary from chance, nature, force. In reference to the voluntary actions, it is needful to know the popular conception of pleasure. Secondly, "What is the character which disposes a man to do wrong, or which exposes him to suffering it ?" These topics must be familiar, in a popular way, to the forensic speaker. He must also know the general grounds on which actions are classed as just or unjust. Actions must be considered, first, in reference to law, which is either special (5f8os), whether written or unwritten, the law of particular places and communities, or else universal (KOIVOS), the law of nature. The second question about an "unjust" action is whether it hurts an individual or the community. The definition of "being wronged" (aSi/ceto-eaj) is, "to be unjustly treated by a voluntary agent." Further, the definition of a particular offence (fTtiypan/j.a) sometimes raises a legal issue. A man may admit an act, and deny that it corresponds to the description given of it by the accuser. It is needful, then, to know the definitions of the principal crimes. It may be noticed that Aristotle here anticipates a topic which played a large part in the later rhetoric. The contested issues which he calls djU(J>iff/37jT^<reis The (Rliet., iii. 16) were the a-rda-fis (constitutiones or status) of later "issues. 5 days. Thus the issue as to the proper definition of an offence, to which he refers here (RJwt., i. 13), coincides with the later