Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 24.djvu/369

WAR 345 which apply properly to the period of actual combat. ThuSj though an enemy may in fact be many marches dis tant, it is necessary to provide against his possible attack, by having some troops always on the alert whilst others are inarching with all the ease and security which the pro tection of these procures for them. It is necessary also in a similar manner to have protection for the repose of an army, and to detail troops for this purpose. All the questions, then, which concern the fixing of " advanced guards" and "rear guards," which protect the front and rear of an advancing army, and the " outposts," which protect an army at rest, are usually included in the study of tactics, though in many instances they may have nothing to do with a battle-field. But again, though the campaign the large field of war which concerns the marches and movements of armies striving against one another to obtain positions of vantage for the actual combat is the province of strategy, yet it may well happen that on the actual battle-field it is necessary to take account, not only of those circumstances which will help to secure victory in the fight, but of the effect which victory or defeat will have upon the campaign. All these considerations we necessarily regard as " strategical," even though they occupy our minds on a battle-field. The art For it must be emphatically asserted that there does of war as no ^ ex i s t } nev er has existed, and never, except by pedants, of whom the most careful students of war are more im patient than other soldiers, has there ever been supposed to exist, an " art of war " which was something other than the methodic study of military history. Those who have most assisted in making the study sufficiently methodic to enable it to be of practical profit in their own profession to soldiers for future use, or to historical students in watching the play of mind between great commanders, have been invariably the most emphatic in denouncing all attempts to formulate a systematic series of " rules of war." Among generals, Mack, the unfortunate Austrian who surrendered at Ulm to Napoleon, and in our own time Count Palikao, who had made himself the laughing stock of the English staff during the advance on Peking, and who was afterwards responsible for bringing about the catastrophe of Sedan, have been the great sticklers for the "rules of war." At least once Count Palikao, in China, came without his sword to look on at the success of operations which lie had denounced as " contrary to every maxim of war." On the other hand, Sir Edward Hamley, who has done more than any other Englishman to make known to English officers the value of a methodical treatment of the study of campaigns, has most vigorously denounced such talk as this. "Nothing is more common," he writes "than to find in writings on military matters reference to the rules of war, and assertions such as that some general violated every principle of war, or that some other general owed his success to knowing when to dispense with the rules of war. It would be difficult to say what these rules are, or in what code they are embodied ; and an inquirer, who is somewhat puzzled, perhaps, to understand how the highest proficiency can be displayed in a science by defiance of its principles, had better resolve to base his own conclusions upon fact and reason alone, when he will probably discover that such criticisms have only very vague ideas for their foundation." Jomini, a very eminent authority in his day, though not a little disposed to somewhat exact definition, and perhaps sometimes to over -pedantic statement, has with very little difference expressed the same view. Clausewitz, probably the most profound of all military students, has even more emphatically declared that the theory of the art of war is valuable, just in so far as it assists to guide a man through the vast labyrinth of military experience, and to prepare his mind to be ready to act for itself under the emergencies of actual war; but, he adds, "it must renounce all preten sion to accompany him on to the field of battle." Both he and Jomini agree in asserting that it must have become with him an instinct, almost absorbed into his blood, to be of any value to him. " The wise teacher," says Clausewitz, " restricts himself to the work of directing and assisting the mental development of his pupil, and does not try to keep him in leading-strings throughout his career." Thus from all countries those who have come to be accepted as authorities on the study of war, the very men who, if any, ought to be tempted to magnify their office, have cried aloud against the abuse of such study. It is not from them, but from non-military writers like Macaulay, that the notion of some formal code of the rules of war has been derived. Macaulay s expression about Peterborough winning battles by violating the rules of war cannot be characterized otherwise than as worthless rhetoric, not only unsupported, but absolutely contradicted by fact. So thoroughly reasoned and so entirely worked out on a principle were Peterborough s campaigns that they have in our own day served to guide one of the most brilliant of English soldiers in the conduct of one of his most successful wars. The campaigns by which Colonel Gordon saved China were largely assisted in their conception by his careful study of Peterborough s generalship in Spain. On the other hand, it is not from writers on war, but from the greatest generals, that the most emphatic state ments have come as to the paramount importance to a soldier of the careful study of past campaigns. The class ical instance of the most authoritative dictum on this sub ject is surrounded by circumstances of dramatic interest. Napoleon in 1813, sitting after dinner surrounded by his marshals, between the first and the second battle of Dres den, was drawn to speak on this subject by Marmont, the one who, in Napoleon s own judgment and that of others, had himself the most complete knowledge of Avar as an art. Marmont, observing how difficult it was, during the con tinued strain of war itself, to improve in its practice, maintaining that rather in peace than in war could war be best studied, said to Napoleon that he thought that Napoleon s own first campaign in Italy was the most brilliant in its conception of any that he had ever fought; so that sixteen years of high command had hardly made his knowledge of war as an art more perfect. Napoleon at once admitted the truth of this, and in reply said, " Yes: Turenne was the only one of us all who constantly improved in the management of his campaigns as he advanced in years." This reply is especially remarkable, because Napoleon was not only the greatest captain of his own age, but he was by far the most careful student that the world has known of the great generals of all ages. It is an unanswerable assertion that only by study of the past experience of war has any great soldier ever prepared him self for commanding armies. It must, however, be always a question how far the circumstances of our own time have .so changed as to limit the period within which it is worth while to devote very careful study to the wars of the past. On the one hand, the greater number of officers in any army will never find time exhaustively to study all the great campaigns which would be of value if they had really so known them as to acquire the experience, as far as may be, of the various actors in them, and it is therefore of special importance that the most modern experiences at least should be completely known to them. On the other hand, even after all the campaigns which have taken place since breech-loaders and rifle-guns have become the determining factors of battles have been carefully studied, it can hardly be claimed for them that they present a picture approximately complete of all the possibilities of modern war. To any one who tells us that nothing applicable to the wars of the future is now to be learnt from the campaigns of Napoleon, or even from

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