Baconian method, and that in which the author took most pride, the process of exclusion or rejection. This elimina tion of the non-essential, grounded on the fundamental propositions with regard to forms, is the most important of Bacon's contributions to the logic of induction, and that in which, as he repeatedly says, his method differs from all previous philosophies. It is evident that if the tables were complete, and our notions of the respective phenomena clear, the process of exclusion would be a merely mechanical counting out, and would infallibly lead to the detection of the cause or form. But it is just as evident that these conditions can never be adequately fulfilled. Bacon saw that his method was impracticable (though he seems to have thought the difficulties not insuperable), and therefore set to work to devise new helps, adminicula. These he enumerates in ii.,^7i. 21: Prerogative Instances, Supports of Induction, Rectification of Induction, Varying the Inves tigation according to the Nature of the Subject, Prerogative Natures, Limits of Investigation, Application to Practice, Preparations for Investigation, the Ascending and Descend ing Scale of Axioms. The remainder of the Organum is devoted to a consideration of the twenty-seven classes of Prerogative Instances, and, though it contains much that is both luminous and helpful, it adds little to our knowledge of what constitutes the Baconian method. On the other heads we have but a few scattered hints. But although the rigorous requirements of science could only be fulfilled by the employ ment of all these means, yet in their absence it was permis sible to draw from the tables and the exclusion an hypotheti cal conclusion, the truth of which might be verified by the use of the other processes; such an hypothesis is called fantastically the First Vintage ( Vindcmiatio}. The induc tive method, so far as exhibited in the Organum, is exem plified by an investigation into the nature of heat.
Such was the method devised by Bacon, and to which he ascribed the qualities of absolute certainty and mechanical simplicity. But even supposing that this method were accurate and completely unfolded, it is evident that it could only be made applicable and produce fruit when the pheno mena of the universe have been very completely tabulated and arranged. In this demand for a complete natural history, Bacon also felt that he was original, and he was deeply impressed with the necessity for it;[1] in fact, he seems occasionally to place an even higher value upon it than upon his Organum. Thus, in the preface to his series of works forming the third part of the Instauratio, he says: " It comes, therefore, to this, that my Organum, even if it were completed, would not without the Natural History much advance the Instauration of the Sciences, whereas the Natural History without the Organum would advance it not a little."[2] But a complete natural history is evidently a thing impossible, and in fact a history can only be collected by attending to the requirements of the Organum. This was seen by Bacon, and what may be regarded as his final opinion on the question is given in the important letter to Baranzano: " With regard to the multitude of instances by which men may be deterred from the attempt, here is my answer. First, what need to dissemble ] Either store of instances must be procured, or the business must be given up. All other ways, however enticing, are impassable. Secondly, the prerogatives of instances, and the mode of experimenting upon experiments of light (which I shall hereafter explain), will diminish the multi tude of them very much. Thirdly, what matter, I ask, if the description of the instances should fill six times as many volumes as Pliny's History? . . . . For the true natural history is to take nothing except instances, con nections, observations, and canons."[3] The Organum and the History are thus correlative, and form the two equally necessary sides of a true philosophy; by their union the new philosophy is produced.
Two questions may be put to any doctrine which pro fesses to effect a radical change in philosophy or science. Is it original? Is it valuable? With regard to the first, it has been already pointed out that Bacon's induction or inductive method is distinctly his own, though it cannot and need not be maintained that the general spirit of his philosophy was entirely new.
The value of the method is a separate and more difficult question. It has been assailed on the most opposite grounds. Macaulay, while admitting the accuracy of the process, denied its efficiency, on the ground that an opera tion performed naturally was not rendered more easy or efficacious by being subjected to analysis.[4] This objection is curious when confronted with Bacon's reiterated asser tion that the natural method pursued by the unassisted human reason is distinctly opposed to his; and it is besides an argument that tells so strongly against many sciences, as to be comparatively worthless when applied to any one. There are, however, more formidable objections against the method. It has been pointed out,[5] and with perfect justice, that science in its progress has not followed the Baconian method; that no one discovery can be pointed to which can be definitely ascribed to the use of his rules, and thatmeuthe most celebrated for their scientific acquirements, while paying homage to the name of Bacon, practically set at naught his most cherished precepts. The reason of this is not far to seek, and has been pointed out by logicians of the most diametrically opposed schools. The mechanical character both of the natural history and of the logical method applied to it, resulted necessarily from Bacon's radically false conception of the nature of cause and of the causal relation. The whole logical or scientific problem is treated as if it were one of co-existence, to which in truth the method of exclusion is scarcely applicable, and the assump tion is constantly made that each phenomenon has one and only one cause.[6] The inductive formation of axioms by a gradually ascending scale is a route which no science has ever followed, and by which no science could ever make progress. The true scientific procedure is by hypothesis followed up and tested by verification; the most powerful instrument is the deductive method, which Bacon can hardly be said to have recognised. The power of framing
- ↑ Distnb. Op. (Works, iv. 23); Parasceve (ibid., 251, 252, 255-25G); Descrip. Glob. Intel., ch. 3.
- ↑ Works, ii. 16; cf. .V. 0., i. 130.
- ↑ Letters and Life, vii. 377.
- ↑ Compare what Bacon says, N. 0., i. 130.
- ↑ Brewster, Life of Newton, 1855 (see particularly vol. ii. 403, 405); Lasson, Ueber Jiaco von VerulamswisscnschaftlichePrincipien, 1860; Liebig, Ueber Fraticis Bacon von Verulam, &c., 1863 (a translation of the last appeared in Macmillaris Magazine for July and August 1863). Although Liebig points out how little science proceeds according to Bacon's rules, yet his other criticisms seem of extremely little value. In a very offensive and quite unjustifiable tone, which is severely commented on by Sigwart and Fischer, he attacks the Baconian methods and its results. These results he claims to find in the Syha Sylvarum, entirely ignoring what Bacon himself has said of the nature of that work (N. 0., i. 117; cf. Eawley's Pref. to the S. S.), and thus putting a false interpretation on the experiments there noted. It is not surprising that he should detect many flaws, but he never fails to exaggerate an error, and seems sometimes completely to miss the point of what Bacon says. (See particularly his remarks on S. S., 33, 336.) The method he explains in such a way as to show he has not a glimpse of its true nature. He brings against Bacon, of all men, the accusations of making induction start from the undetermined perceptions of the senses, of using imagination, and of putting a quite arbitrary interpretation on phenomena. He crowns his criticism by expounding what he considers to be the true scientific method, which, as has been pointed out by Fischer, is simply that Baconian doctrine against which his attack ought to have been directed. (See his account of the method, Ueber Bacon, 47-49; K. Fischer, Bacon, p. 490-502.)
- ↑ Mill, Logic, ii. pp. 115, 110, 329, S30.
