of the Human Mind, 4 vols., of which the Physiology is an abstract. The fame achieved by the Lectures when pub lished surpassed even what they had attained when delivered. It is no exaggeration to say that never before or since has a work of metaphysics been so popular. In 1851 the book had reached its 19th edition in England, and in America its success was perhaps greater. Since that time, however, its popularity has declined with almost equal rapidity; judgments on its merits are now as severe as they were formerly favourable, and the name of Brown may be said to be a dead letter in the annals of philosophy. It is interesting to inquire how far this extravagant laudation and neglect are justifiable ; and it is of importance to know exactly what were Brown s contributions to mental
science, and how far his system is consistent and true.
Some part of Brown s popularity is no doubt to be accounted for from the fact that he was the leader of a revolt against the estab lished system of philosophical thought in Scotland. It had come to be looked upon as established that in the common sense philosophy of Reid alone were metaphysical truth and soundness to be found. Brown not only showed that in many points of detail the earlier Scottish psychology was in fault, above all in their crucial doctrine of perception, but changed the whole aspect of the science by treating it- from a thoroughly new and original standpoint. Still more of his fame was due to the lively impression made by his brilliant rhetorical powers. It was a novelty to find the most subtle analysis expounded in the most richly poetical language. Philosophical diction had been dry enough in Reid, and though Dugald Stewart was a master of literary exposition, his eloquence was of a chaste and elegant kind. Brown s, on the other hand, is florid and ornamental to excess, and one soon wearies of the copious quotations from poets like Akenside, Beattie, or Young. Yet the style had, and still has, a certain fascination. But in addition to these extraneous causes, one cannot help acknowledging as the main reason for Brown s quick accession to fame, his undeniable acute- ness and originality. His mind was extraordinarily quick and active ; there is not one of his lectures which does not contain either some addition to the older doctrine, or some new and striking applica tion of it. What a mind of such fertility and subtility might have achieved had the thinker been spared a little longer, it would be hard to say. But it must not be forgotten in estimating his merits, that we possess only part of his system, and that he had not brought his psychology to bear upon the deeper problems of metaphysics.
Of "positive contributions made by him to mental science, the following are perhaps the most important: -(I.) General con ception of the object and method of psychology. According to him mental phenomena are to be treated by the recognized methods of physical science. Complex mental facts are to be resolved into their simple elements ; and sequences of such facts are to be analyzed so as to bring out the general laws of their connection. Analysis is thus the one instrument to be employed. (2.) View of mental processes and rejection of the ordinary doctrine of faculties. Just as physical science has to analyze and trace the connections of the various phenomena or modes of appearance of matter, without ever reaching the essence which lies behind them, so psychology treats all mental facts as states or modes or modifications of the mind. Perceptions, abstractions, emotions, or desires are simply the mind in the several states of perceiving, abstracting, feeling, or desiring. The so-called faculties are nothing but the various modes in which mental activity manifests itself. Consciousness is not to be distinguished from the several mental states. Mental modifi cations may be classified according to what gives rise to them ; they spring up either after some internal cause, or after some other mental mode. In the first case they may be called external states, in the second, internal. The internal may be again divided into intellectual and emotional. (3.) Analysis of touch into touch proper and the muscular sense. This is perhaps the most valuable of Brown s contributions. There are no doubt anticipations of the division, particularly in De Tracy, whom Brown had studied, but his originality is, wo think, beyond question. The analysis has since been carried out much more perfectly than by Brown. (4.) Theory of extension. Brown was one of the first to attempt the resolution of our knowledge of extension into a series of muscular feelings, successive in time. His analysis is exceedingly acute, though in many points it must now be looked upon as erroneous. (5.) Doctrine of perception. According to him, all that we know of the external world consists of the feelings of resistance, outness, and extension, which are combined into one complex state ; but our intuitive belief in the causal principle compels us to postulate a real existence as jying behind and giving rise to these feelings. (6.) Prominence given to the doctrine of suggestion or association. All internal intellectual states may be reduced to simple suggestions, i.e., where one state arises in consequence of another, and to relative suggestion, where the relation between two states gives rise to a third state. Brown analyzes with great skill the powers of sugges tion or association, and illustrates very fully the primary and secondary states. Under the head of relative suggestion, he discusses at great length the perception of resemblance or similarity, and draws out an elaborate theory of generalization, intended to supple ment the defective view of the Nominalist and to reduce to its proper sphere the supposed abstract idea of the Conceptualist. The analysis was highly popular in its time, but has little of real novelty in it. (7.) Ethical doctrine. To this Brown added little ; indeed, the weakest part of his psychology is that bearing upon the will, which he identifies with desire. With regard to conscience, he postulates the existence of a primitive susceptibility to moral emotion; i.e., a certain ethical feeling is infallibly excited by those actions of agents which are right or wrong.
On the whole, it will be seen from this brief statement of what was new in Brown s philosophy, that it occupies an intermediate place between the earlier Scottish school and the later analytical or associational psychology. To the latter Brown really belonged, but he had preserved certain doctrines of the older school which were out of harmony with his fundamental view. He still retained a small quantum of intuitive beliefs, and did not appear to see that the very existence of these could not be explained by his theory of mental action. This intermediate or wavering position accounts for the comparative neglect into which his works have now fallen. They did much to excite thinking, and advanced many problems by more than one step, but they did not furnish a coherent system, and the doctrines which were then new have since been worked out with greater consistency and clearness.
For a severe criticism of Brown, see Sir W. Hamilton s Discussions and Lectures on Metaphysics ; and for a high estimate of his merits, see J. S. Mill s Examination of Hamilton. The only German writer who seems to have known anything of Brown is Beueke, who found in him anticipations of some of his own doctrines. See Die Ncue Psychologic, pp. 320-330.
BROWN, Ulysses Maximilian, a celebrated general in the imperial armies, son of Ulysses, Baron Brown and Camus, a colonel of cuirassiers, was descended of an ancient Irish family, and was born at Basel in 1705. After study ing at Limerick, Rome, and Prague he entered the army, becoming in 1723 captain in the rsgimeht of his uncle, Count George Brown, and in 1725 lieutenant-colonel. He served with great distinction in Corsica and Italy, and in 1739 was made field-marshal-lieutenant, and counsellor in the aulic council of war. After the death of the Emperor Charles VI. he became one of the foremost generals in the army of the Empress-Queen Maria Theresa, and gained a high reputation for military skill. On the outbreak of the Seven Years War, Count Brown, with the rank of field- marshal, assembled his army in Bohemia, and repulsed the Prussians at the battle of Lowositz. He was mor tally wounded at the great battle of Prague, and was carried into the town, where he expired on the 20th June 1757.
7, 1755, was the son of the Rev. William Brown, minister of the English church in that city. The father, having been appointed professor of ecclesiastical history at St Andrews, returned to Scotland in 1757, and his son was in due time sent to the grammar school of that city. At the age of twelve he entered the university, and after passing through the classes of divinity, removed in 1774 to the university of Utrecht, where he combined with the study of theology that of the civil law. In 1777 he was appointed to the charge of the English church in Utrechb, which had been previously held by his father and uncle. About 1788 he was appointed to the professorship of moral philosophy and ecclesiastical history in the university of Utrecht, to which was soon added the professorship of the law of nature. The war which followed the French Revolu tion finally drove Dr Brown from the place of his nativity. In January 1795 he made his escape to England. In London he experienced such a reception as was due to his literary talents and moral worth ; and in 1795 the magis trates of Aberdeen appointed him to the chair of divinity
on the retirement of Dr George Campbell, and soon after he
