Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 9.djvu/147

F I C H T E 137 apparently found in quite external influences, principally that of Sehelling s Naturphilosophie, to some extent that ofSchleiermacher. But as a rule most of those who have adopted this view have done so without the full and patient examination which the matter demands ; they have been misled by the difference in tone and style between the earlier and later writings, and have concluded that underlying this was a fundamental difference of philosophic conception. One only, Erdmann, in his Entuncklung d. dents. Spck. seit Kant, 29, seems to give full references to justify his opinion, and even he, in his later work, Grundriss dcr Gcsch. der I kilos. (ed. 3), 311, admits that the difference is much less than he had at the first imagined. He certainly retains his former opinion, but mainly on the groun J, in itself intelligible and legitimate, that, so far as Fichte s philosophical reputation and influence are concerned, attention may be limited to the earlier doctrines of the Wisscn- schaftslchrc. This may be so, but it can neither be admitted that Fichte s views underwent radical change, nor that the Wisseiischafts- Ichre was ever regarded as in itself complete, nor that Fichte was unconscious of the apparent difference between his earlier and later utterances. It is demonstrable by various passages in the works and letters that he never looked upon the IVisscnschaftslfhre as con taining the whole system ; it is clear from the chronology of his writings that the modifications supposed to be due to other thinkers were from the first implicit in his theory ; and if one fairly traces the course of thought in the early writings, one can see how he was inevitably led on to the statement of the later and, at first sight, divergent views. On only one point, the position assigned in the WissenscJiaftslchrc to the absolute ego, is there any obscurity ; but the relative passages are far from decisive, and from the early work, Neuc Darstellung dcr IVisscnschaftslchre, unquestionably to be in cluded in the Jena period, one can see that from the outset the doctrine of the absolute ego was held in a form differing only in statement from the later theory. Fichte s system is one absolutely refusing to be compressed with intelligibility. We shall here note only three points : (a) the origin in Kant ; (b) the fundamental principle and method of the IViasenschaftslfhre ; (c) the connexion with the later writings. The most important works for (a) are the " Review of yEnesidemus," and the Second Introduction to the IVissenscluiftslchre ; for (b) the great treatises of the Jena period ; for (c) the Thatsachcn dcs Bewusstseyns of 1810. (a) The Kantian system had for the first time opened up a truly fruitful line of philosophic speculation, the transcendental con sideration of knowledge, or the analysis of the conditions under which cognition is possible. To Kant the fundamental condition was given in the synthetical unity of consciousness. The primitive fact under which might be gathered the special conditions of that synthesis which we call cognition was this unity. But by Kant there was no attempt made to show that the said special conditions were necessary from the very nature of consciousness itself. Their necessity was discovered and proved in a manner which might be called empirical. Moreover, while Kant in a quite similar manner pointed out that intuition had special conditions, space and time, ne did not show any link of connexion between these and the primitive conditions of pure cognition. Closely connected with this remarkable defect in the Kantian view, lying, indeed, at the founda tion of it, was thedoctrine that the matter of cognition is altogether given, or thrown into the form of cognition from without. So strongly was this doctrine emphasized by Kant, that he seemed to refer the matter of knowledge to the action upon us of a non-ego or Ding-an-sich, absolutely beyond consciousness. While these hints towards a completely intelligible account of cognition were given by Kant, they were not reduced to system, and from the way in which the elements of cognition were related, could not be so reduced. Only in the sphere of practicalreason, where the intelligible nature prescribed to itself its own laws, was there the possibility of systematic deduction from a single principle. The peculiar position in which Kant had left the theory of cognition was assailed from many different sides and by many writers, specially by Schultze (/Enesidemus) and Maimon. To the criticisms of the latter, in particular, Fichte owed much, but his own activity went far beyond what they supplied to him. To complete Kant s work, to demonstrate that all the necessary con ditions of knowledge can be deduced from a single principle, and consequently to expound the complete system of reason, that is the business of the IVissenschaft.slehre. By it the theoretical and practical reason shall be shown to coincide; for while the categories of cognition and the whole system of pure thought can be expounded from one principle, the ground of this principle is scientifically, or to cognition, inexplicable, and is made conceivable only in the practical philosophy. The ultimate basis for the activity of cogni tion is given by the will. Even in the practical sphere, however, Fichte found that the contradiction, insoluble to cognition, was not completely suppressed, and he was thus driven to the higher view, which is explicitly stated in the later writings, though not, it must be confessed, with the precision and scientific clearness of the Wisscnsduiftshhre. (b) What, then, is this single principle, and how does it work itself out into system ? To answer this one must bear in mind what Fichte intended by designating all philosophy AVissenschafts- lehre, or theory of science. Philosophy is to him the rethinking of actual cognition, the theory of knowledge, the complete, systematic exposition of the principles which lie at the basis of all reasoned cognition. It traces the necessary acts by which the cognitive consciousness comes to be what it is, both in form and content. Not that it is a natural history, or even a phenomenology of con sciousness ; only in the later writings did Fichte adopt even the genetic method of exposition ; it is the complete statement of the pure principles of the understanding in their rational or necessary order. But if complete, this Wissenschaftslehre must be able to deduce the whole organism of cognition from certain fundamental axioms, themselves unproved and incapable of proof ; only thus can we have a system of reason. From these primary axioms the whole body of necessary thoughts must be developed, and, as Socrates would say, the argument itself will indicate the path of the development. Of such primitive principles, the absolutely necessary conditions of possible cognition, only three are thinkable, one perfectly un conditioned both in form and matter ; a second, unconditioned in form but not in matter ; a third, unconditioned in matter but not in form. Of these, evidently the first must be the fundamental ; to some extent it conditions the other two, though these cannot be deduced from it or proved by it. The statement of these principles forms the introduction to Wissenschaftslehre. The method which Fichte first adopted for stating these axioms is not calculated to throw full light upon them, and tends to exaggerate the apparent airiness and unsubstantial! ty of his deduction. They may be explained thus. The primitive condition of all intelligence is that the ego shall posit, affirm, or be aware of itself. The ego is the ego ; such is the first pure act of conscious intelli gence, that by which alone consciousness can come to be what it is. It is what Fichte called a Deed-act (ThaUiaitdluncj) ; we cannot tie aware of the process, the ego is not until it has affirmed itself, but we are aware of the result, and can see the necessity of the act by which it is brought about. The ego then posits itself as real. What the ego posits is real. But in consciousness there is equally given a primitive act of op-positing, or contra-positing, formally distinct from the act of position, but materially determined, in so far as what is op-posited must be the negative of that which was posited. The non-ego not, be it noticed, the world as we know it is op-posed in consciousness to the ego. The ego is not the non-ego. How this act of op-positing is possible and necessary, only becomes clear in the practical philosophy, and even there the inherent difficulty leads to a higher view. But third, we have now an absolute antithesis to our original thesis. Only the ego is real, but the non-ego is posited in the ego. The contradiction is solved in a higher synthesis, which takes up into itself the two opposites. The ego and non-ego limit one another, or determine one another; and, as limitation is negation of part of a divisible quantum, in this third act, the divisible ego is op-posed to a divisible non-ego. From this point onwards the course proceeds by the method already made clear. We progress by making explicit the oppositions contained in the fundamental synthesis, by uniting these opposites, analysing the new synthesis, and so on, until we reach an ultimate pair. Now, in the synthesis of the third act two principles may be distinguished : (1) the non-ego determines the ego ; (2) the ego determines the non-ego. As determined the ego is theoretical, as determining it is practical ; ultimately the opposed principles must be united by showing how the ego is both determining and deter mined. It is impossible to enter here on the steps by which the theo retical ego is shown to develop into the complete system of cognitive- categories, or to trace the deduction of the processes (productive imagination, intuition, sensation, understanding, judgment, reason) by which the quite indefinite non-ego comes to assume the appear ance of definite objects in the forms of time nnd space. Ail this evolution is the necessary consequence of the determination of the ego by the non-ego. But it is clear that the non-ego cannot really determine the ego. There is no reality beyond the ego itself. The contradiction can only be suppressed if the ego itself opposes to itself the non-ego, places it as an Anstoss or plane on which its own activity breaks and from which it is reflected. Now, this op- positing of the A mtoss is the necessary condition of the practical ego, of the will. If the ego be a striving power, then of necessity a limit must be set by which its striving is manifest. But how can the infinitely active ego posit a limit to its own activity ? Here we come to the crux of Fichte s system, which is only partly cleaied up in the Rcchtslehre and Sittenlchre. If the ego be pure activity, free activity, it can only become aware of itself by. positing some limit. We cannot possibly have any cognition of how such an act is possible. But as it is a free act, the ego cannot be determined to it by anything beyond itself ; it cannot be aware of its own free dom otherwise than as determined by other free egos. Thus in the RecMslchre and Sittenlchre, the multiplicity of egos is deduced, and IX. 18