Page:England & Russia in Central Asia,Vol-I.djvu/137

Russia's military strength in central asia. 117 reply to a Russian occupation of the Turcoman strong- hold. In Kara Kum, and even in Persia — despite the treaties — there is no such check on Russian impulse ; and it would be difficult for anyone to define the point when encroachments on the Persian frontier would, in the eyes of the vast mass of the English people, constitute a just casus belli. And even if a war for the defence of Persia's integrity were decided upon, it is greatly to be feared that it would not be sanctioned because it was recognised that national interests of the highest importance were at stake. We have clearly to keep before us the fact that there is danger to India from Russia in two quarters; and that in many respects that from Persia is the more formid- able. It is also in the present age the less recognised. Up to a certain point — in fact, up to the occupation of Meshed or Sarakhs, if Russia plays her cards with any of that astuteness with which she has been credited — it would be almost impossible to arrest the progress of Russia's army, and the very gravity of the danger in this quarter is its insidiousness. Russia's military strength in Central Asia is limited and in an undeveloped stage. But there can be no doubt that it exists, and that for the accomplishment of any ordinary enterprise it would suffice. In the direction of the Caspian, where the army of the Cau- casus — behind which stands the European army — can be called into play, it is formidable ; and if ever India is to be wrested from England by external force, it will be from this direction that the attack will be