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288 REVIEWS OF BOOKS April fail, as at New Orleans, the ignorant jeer. Sir John's criticisms on Prevost, Ross, Keane, and Pakenham are quiet and sane. But, above all, he has emphasized the need of an understanding between naval and military officers, for nothing but careful planning beforehand can ensure success when each class views the operations from a different standpoint. Here his language is bitter ; the advice of the naval officers was ' due chiefly to the desire for prize money ', and the three chief ones were Scots ; similar dictation by naval to military men had occurred at Cadiz and Ferrol. He forgets to add that the same Alexander Cochrane, who was primarily responsible for launching the attack on New Orleans, had co-operated well with Abercrombie in the landing at Aboukir Bay. In the main story of the Peninsular War he argues sanely on Welling- ton's difficulties, and bitterly on whig factiousness at home. Joseph is shown as in a state of cruel perplexity, Napoleon withdrawing troops from him and giving him orders without understanding his position, Clarke doing the same, Clausel failing to co-operate and therefore failing to be in time at Vittoria. Sir John is not satisfied about the tactics at this battle, for Wellington's columns attacked at wide intervals, and Graham did not press Reille closely enough. 'The indiscipline after Vittoria, and again after the storm of San Sebastian, is treated character- istically. But perhaps the account of the battles in the Pyrenees after Soult's return is the most interesting ; the terrain was unlike that of any of the earlier campaigns, the conditions were unlike those of 1810, when Massena was known to be preparing to advance and Wellington knew the geography of the Portuguese frontier thoroughly. Now mountain warfare has a fascination for the layman, especially if he has studied Napoleon's campaigns in 1796-7' and the crown prince's passage of the Giant Moun- tains in 1866. Napoleon with his main force held the low ground in the centre ready to fall on the Austrians separately as they debouched at the foot of the valleys ; Benedek allowed the Prussians to debouch unchecked. But Wellington planted his divisions in the passes, leaving them isolated with high ridges between, ready indeed to fall back to a common centre, but without a strong central reserve to rally them ; consequently Soult massed his three corps to break through each by a different pass. But he attacked precipitately ; and in spite of the strange irresolution of Cole and Picton, who fell back almost to Pampeluna, only Reille and Clausel penetrated through, and their men were weary and starving ; one wonders if they were indeed really able to haul any guns so far, for certainly they were short of ammunition and supplies. On the other hand, in spite of William Stewart's officious and stupid attention to anything but his own duty, D'Erlon was sufficiently held up by Hill. Still Clausel had in fact turned Hill's rear, though he was not able to maintain his advantage. We have then that most dramatic episode of Wellington galloping his thoroughbred at full speed uphill to the ridge of Sorauren, where in full view of both armies he saved the position. Soult must have found his men badly shaken as he led them back to France. Then followed Wellington's passage of the Bidassoa and the Nivelle, where Soult's lines were very strong but too long, so that there was little difficulty in breaking through