stantive renewal rights” and will register the conflicting claim of a determined applicant. Id. This drastic diversity in the treatment of original and renewal applications confirms our interpretation of § 209. Congress surely did not intend that such great weight attach to renewal certificates issued to all claimants regardless of questions concerning validity.[1]
Finally, even assuming that some presumption of validity might attach to Epoch’s renewal certificate, at least where 27 years passed without challenge, that presumption would certainly be dissipated, as in the case of the § 209 presumption, see, e. g., Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Citation Fabrics Corp., 328 F.Supp. 554, 555 (S.D.N.Y.1971); United Merchants and Manufacturers, Inc. v. Sarne Co., Inc., 278 F.Supp. 162, 164 (S.D.N.Y.1967), by proof that material statements in the certificate were false. As outlined above, the documentary evidence introduced at trial showed that Epoch could not have been the author of the film, even though this status was claimed in the renewal application and there is no proof that Majestic or DWG Corp. employed Griffith to make the motion picture for hire. Indeed, none of the evidence supports the assertion made in the renewal certificate that the film was made for hire, and much of it (including the documentary records regarding the original copyright) points to a contrary conclusion. In these circumstances, any evidentiary weight that the renewal certificate might otherwise have had is offset and the burden of proving the validity of its renewal is shifted back to Epoch, Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F.Supp. 776, 780–81 (S.D.N.Y.1968). Epoch has failed to sustain that burden.
Epoch’s alternative ground upon which a jury might have upheld its renewal is based on the assignment of the original term copyright from DWG Corp. in 1915. As explained above, the copyright in both the published and unpublished versions of the film was originally secured by DWG Corp. and then assigned to Dixon and Epoch in instruments dated April 17, 1915. Relying mainly upon broad language found in each assignment, which purports to transfer to Epoch all of the rights in the copyright enjoyed by the assignor, DWG Corp., Epoch now argues that these assignments can be fairly construed to have conveyed to it the right to both the original term copyright and the renewal copyright in The Birth. We disagree.
The construction of the assignments urged by Epoch is not one that a jury could fairly adopt, given the record in this case.[2] While Epoch is correct that both assignments contain broad general language purporting to convey to Epoch all of the DWG Corp.’s interest in the film, that language is necessarily limited in its application by the specific description in each assignment of the interest
- ↑ Only one of the parties, Epoch Producing, cites any case authority on this presumption issue. The one case cited by Epoch, Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.1974), is unpersuasive. While the opinion does accord prima facie weight, pursuant to § 209, to a renewal copyright certificate, id. at 733–34, it does so without any consideration or analysis of the factors discussed in the text, which distinguish original and renewal applications. Moreover, it cites as authority for according such weight to renewal certificates only decisions which considered original copyright certificates. Furthermore, this decision was rendered in a case still pending in the Southern District of New York and has not yet been reviewed by this court.
- ↑ In the construction of copyright assignments, as with contracts and other writings, the meaning to be placed on the words of the assignment ultimately turns upon the intention of the parties to the agreement. Venus Music Corp. v. Mills Music, Inc., 261 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958); Rossiter v. Vogel, 134 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1943). That intention is to be determined from the evidence submitted to the court, including the agreement itself, statements and actions of the parties contemporaneous with and following the agreement, oral testimony, affidavits, depositions, and other equally competent evidence. The only evidence as to the intent of the parties introduced in this case was the agreements themselves.
