Strength and Violence of each of these Parties will much depend upon the particular Administration. An Administration may be so bad as to throw a great Majority into the Country Party; as a good Administration will reconcile to the Court many of the most passionate Lovers of Liberty. But, however the Nation may fluctuate betwixt these two Parties, the Parties will always subsist, as long as we are govern'd by a limited Monarchy.
But, besides this Difference of Principle, those Parties are very much fomented by a Difference of Interest, without which they cou'd scarce ever be dangerous or violent. The Crown will naturally bestow all its Trust and Power upon those, whose Principles, real or pretended, are most favourable to Monarchical Government; and this Temptation will naturally engage them to go greater Lengths than their Principles wou'd otherwise carry them. Their Antagonists, who are disappointed in their ambitious Aims, throw themselves into the Party, whose Principles incline them to be most jealous of Royal Power, and naturally carry those Principles to a greater Length than sound Politics will justify. Thus, theCourt
