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among men that it may plausibly be called a sort of natural necessity[1],—that the stronger shall rule the weaker. No speaker in Thucydides goes quite so far as Callicles in the Gorgias, or proclaims this to be "natural" as distinguished from "conventional" justice. It is not said to be just, but only natural and not unreasonable[2]. The argument against capital punishment, which is put into the mouth of Diodotus, rests on the observation that no restraints have yet been devised which can be trusted to keep human passions in check. Legislators have gone through the whole list of possible penalties, and even the prospect of death is found insufficient to deter those who are goaded by want or ambition, and tempted by opportunity[3]. The friendship of men and of communities must be founded in the first place on a persuasion of mutual benevolence, and on some congeniality of character[4]; but in the long-run the only sure bond between States is identity of interests[5]. The Peloponnesian league is loose just because the interests diverge[6]. In default of a common interest, the only guarantee for an alliance is balanced fear[7]. Similarly, in the relation of the citizen to the State, patriotism is enforced by the dependence of private on public welfare[8]. Pericles even says that no fair

  1. v. 105, ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας οὗ ἂν κρατῇ ἄρχειν. Cf. iv. 61, vi. 87.
  2. vi. 85, οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι καὶ ξυμφέρον.
  3. iii. 45 § 3.
  4. iii. 10.
  5. i. 124.
  6. i. 141.
  7. τὸ ἀντίπαλον δέος, iii. 11; cf. iv. 92.
  8. ii. 60.