Page:Essays on the Principles of Human Action (1835).djvu/77

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HUMAN ACTION.
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the only perplexity that crosses my mind in thinking of it, arises from the utter impossibility of conceiving of the contrary supposition,) it will follow that those faculties which may be said to constitute self, and the operations of which convey that idea to the mind, draw all their materials from the past and present. But all voluntary action must relate solely and exclusively to the future. That is, all those impressions or ideas with which selfish, or more properly speaking, personal feelings must be naturally connected, are just those which have nothing at all to do with the motives of action.

If indeed it were possible for the human mind to alter the present or the past, so as either to recal what has been done, or, to give it a still greater reality, to make it exist over again and in some more emphatical sense, then man might with some pretence of reason be supposed naturally incapable of being impelled to the pursuit of any past or present object, but from the mechanical

    identity and self-interest have just the same principle and extent, and can reach no farther than his actual existence. But if a man of a metaphysical turn, seeing that the pier was not yet finished, but was to be continued to a certain point, and in a certain direction, should take it into his head to insist that what was already built and what was to be built; were the same pier, that the one must afford as good footing as the other, and should accordingly walk over the pier-head on the solid foundation of his metaphysical hypothesis—he would argue, perhaps, more ridiculously, but not a whit more absurdly, than those who found a principle of absolute self-interest on a man's future identity with his present being. But, it is said, the comparison does not hold in this, for the man can extend his thoughts (and that very wisely too) beyond the present moment, whereas in the other case he cannot move a single step forwards. Granted: but this will only shew that the mind has wings as well as feet; which of itself is a sufficient answer to the selfish hypothesis.