should be ever so great. The frequent recurrence of the imitation on the other hand, if it has had its usual effect, renders the recollection of the object less certain or at any rate less vivid every time, till at last what remains of it is entirely lost, and confounded with the imitation[1]. Again, it is also certain that the proximity of the parts of an object to one another, or of one object to another object is of itself a sufficient reason for their recollection in succession or together, in the same order in which they were actually perceived. Unless this were the case, we could never recollect any thing at all, as every object is necessarily composed of parts, and those again of others without end. Now how are we to reconcile this with the first-mentioned inference that thought is uniformly and necessarily communicated to every part of the thinking substance 2 If thought is produced in such a manner, that the shock is immediately felt in those parts nearest the seat of the individual impression, and is indeed sure to excite thought in them without generally ever affecting the remote parts of the brain in the same manner, it seems strange that its own communication over the whole brain should be so rapid and certain, while its power of producing other thoughts by simple impulse is so unequal.
I hope I shall be pardoned some inconsistencies of expression in treating of this subject. In order to disprove the theory which I am combating I must first assume its truth, and go on talking of the seats of our ideas, the different parts of the brain, the communication of thought by impulse, &c. till I can show that the hypothesis to which all these expressions refer is in reality good for nothing.
- ↑ No doubt the picture is always looked at with a very different feeling from what it would have been, if the idea of the person had never been distinctly associated with it.
