in this form. Can it possibly be the case, then, that, when we judge an action to be right or wrong, each of us is only asserting that he himself has some particular feeling towards it?
It seems to me that there is an absolutely fatal objection to the view that this is the case. It must be remembered that the question is merely a question of fact; a question as to the actual analysis of our moral judgments—as to what it is that actually happens, when we think an action to be right or wrong. And if we remember that it is thus merely a question as to what we actually think, when we think an action to be right or wrong,—neither more nor less than this,—it can, I think, be clearly seen that the view we are considering is inconsistent with plain facts. This is so, because it involves a curious consequence, which those who hold it do not always seem to realise that it involves; and this consequence is, I think, plainly not in accordance with the facts. The consequence is this. If, when one man says, “This action is right,” and another answers, “No, it is not right,”
