get the question clear, should take such a view; and, if anybody were to, I think it is self-evident that he would be wrong.
It may, however, be asked: If the matter is as plain as this, how has it come about that anybody ever has adopted the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure, or has ever argued, as if it were so? And I think one chief answer to this question is that those who have done so have not clearly realised all the consequences of their view, partly because they have been too exclusively occupied with the particular question as to whether, in the case of the total consequences of actual voluntary actions, degree of intrinsic value is not always in proportion to quantity of pleasure—a question, which, as has been admitted, is, in itself, much more obscure. But there is, I think, another reason, which is worth mentioning, because it introduces us to a principle of great importance. It may, in fact, be held, with great plausibility, that no whole can ever have any intrinsic value unless it contains some pleasure; and it might be thought, at first sight, that this
