got it. It might, perhaps, be thought that it is possible to find some pair of feelings or some single feeling, in the case of which this rule does not hold: that, for instance, no man ever really feels moral approval towards an action, towards which another feels moral disapproval. This is a view which people are apt to take, because, where we have a strong feeling of moral disapproval towards an action, we may find it very difficult to believe that any other man really has a feeling of moral approval towards the same action, or even that he regards it without some degree of moral disapproval. And there is some excuse for this view in the fact, that when a man says that an action is right, and even though he sincerely believes it to be so, it may nevertheless be the case that he really feels towards it some degree of moral disapproval. That is to say, though it is certain that men’s opinions as to what is right and wrong often differ, it is not certain that their feelings always differ when their opinions do. But still, if we look at the extraordinary differences that there have been and are between
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