but shifted his position in accordance with his political necessities. During his long warfare with Charles V. he balanced the need of maintaining friendly relations with Portugal against the economic advantage derived from the capture of Portuguese ships. Moreover, he was influenced by the counsels of Admiral Brion-Chabot, who was in the pay of Portugal. In 1536, Portugal apparently sought to secure her own ships and colonies from French attack by permitting the French to use the harbors of Portugal, the Azores, and other Portuguese islands, as lurking-places whence they might prey upon the Spanish treasure-fleets and to which they might bring their prizes. The Portuguese-French treaty of this date was highly injurious to Spain.
Not only did the French corsairs plague the fleets and oversea settlements of Spain, but, as indicated by Cartier's voyages, they were bent on establishing themselves on the mainland of America. So alarming was this prospect to the Emperor Charles V. that he was apparently willing to conclude an agreement with the French, permitting them to trade in the Indies if they would not attempt any discoveries or other enterprises there. An article (Doc. 18) to this effect was signed by the French commissioners, but it was not ultimately accepted by Spain, partly on account of the opposition of the King of Portugal.
Portuguese as well as Spanish shipping suffered terribly from the French privateers, and in 1552, when war between the Emperor and France was about to be renewed, articles (Doc. 19) were concluded between Portugal and Spain, providing, inter alia, for the protection of their Indian fleets. In a truce, signed with Spain four years later, the French relinquished their navigation and trade in the Indies (Doc. 20), but in the negotiations that resulted in the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, an oral agreement was made, apparently to the effect that the French would navigate west of the prime meridian and south of the tropic of Cancer at their own risk, and that what was done in those regions would not be regarded as violating international amity, since treaties would have no force beyond these lines (Doc. 21).
For a long period after the settlement made at Cateau-Cambrésis, France was so distracted by civil strife that she was unable to carry on a vigorous policy abroad. Enterprises, like Coligny's Florida colony, or the Azores expedition whereby France planned to purchase the region of Brazil, by aiding the Prior of Crato to recover from Spain the Portuguese crown, failed grievously. So closely were the French Catholic leaders of the League bound to Spanish interests, that in their treaty of 1585 they promised Philip to put a stop to the French voyages to the Indies and Azores (Doc. 22).
In 1595 Henry IV., having established himself on the French throne, declared war on Spain, and in 1596 he sought to form an alliance with the two great sea-powers, England and the United Provinces, against their common enemy (Doc. 23).
