LAWRENCE (Case No. 8,136) [15 Fed. Cas. page 32} actual iixtention in doubt, tlie respondents were bound to make inquiry of him specific- ally bef-ore assuming that lie meant to aban- don any tiling. Mowry v. Sheldon, 2 R. I. 378. See, also, Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet. [32 U. S.] 320. Whatever might be the legal effect of the language used, yet if in fact they knew that the complainant did not intend it to be and did not believe it to be an abandonment, they cannot be heard to set it up as an abandonment. It is clear that this was the case: he proceeded with his work under the agreement, at great labor and ex- pense to himself, and they never offered to re- lieve him of it, or to cancel his obligations to to llr. Erockhaiis. The explicit directions they gave to Mr. Dana, not to make any use of Mr. Lawrence's notes, and the idea Mr. Dana derived from them of his duty in the premises, exactly conform to the memoran- dum; and one avowed reason for these in- structions was to guard against any com- plaint from Mr. Lawrence, and because they felt embarrassed by their relations growing out of the Broekhaiis matter. After receiv- ing the letter they rely on, in which Mr. Lawrence returned the formal instrument as not satisfying the memorandum. Miss Wheat- on wrote, "He declined it, and preferred none beyond the one signed in June by M. iJ. AY." This is conclusive that their under- standing was that he meant to decline the further paper and to stand on and not abandon the memorandum of June. Such an estoppel could operate to give even to a valid instrument an effect conti-ary to the legal interpretation of its language. Hawes V. Marchant [Case No. 6,240]; Erwin v. Lowry, 7 How. [48 U. S.] 183; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. V. Howard, 13 How, [54 U. S.] 336, Neither Mr. Lawrence's letter, nor his conduct, nor any acts of his give rise to any estoppel against him. Hawes v. Marchant [supra]; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. [52 U. S.] 326; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & E. 469; Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 661; Andrews v. Lyons, 11 Allen, 351; Turner v. Coffin, 12 Allen, 401; Lawrence v. Dole, 11 Yt 555; Brewer v. Boston & W. R. R., 5 Mete. [Mass.] 483; Heane v. Rogers, 9 Barn, & C. 585; Cambridge Sav. Bank v. Littlefield, 6 Cush. 214; Wallis v. Truesdell, 6 Pick. 456; Dunnell M. Co. v. Pawtucket, 7 Gray, 277; 2 Smith, Lead. Cas, (Am. Ed,) 704, 742, 745, 747, 767, 768; Am, Lead. Cas, 750, 764, 768, 772, 775, 776. The evidence negatives the existence of all the essential elements of an estoppel. They had full and express notice of Mr. Lawrence's rights, before the acts complained of. Miss Wheaton and the other respondents are estopped to set up the invalidity of those copy- rights. Bicoltz V. Bannister, 1 Barnard. 77; Caimcross v. Lorimer, 3 Law T. [N, S.] 130; Hull Flax & Cotton Mill Co. v. Wellesley, 2 Law T. [N. S.] 728; Simms v. Marryat, 7 Eng. Law & Eq. 337; Sherman v. Champlam T. Co., 31 Yt. 175; Beckman v. Bormann, 3 E. D. Smith,
- Random v. Tobey, 11 How. [52 U. S.]
521; Coolidge v. Brigham, 1 Mete. [Mass.] 551; Pierpont v. Fowle [Case No. 11,152] r Smith, Lead. Cas.704. The agreement amounts to an express covenant "to make no use of Lawrence's notes without his written consent;" and this is binding on all the respondents, and its violation will be restrained by the court. Barfield v. Kelly, 4 Russ. 355; Farhia v. Sil- verlock, 1 Kay & J. 509, 39 Eng, Law & Eq. 516; Longman v. Oxberry, Gods, Pat. 314, The agreement of June covers not only the foot-notes, but all that ilr, Lawrence, as edi- tor and annotator, did to the book to make it different from Mr. Wheaton's last edition of 1845. Mr, Parsons describes the agreement as intended to give to Mrs, Lawrence "any thing he had done for her husband's book;" the memorandum which Mr. Parsons drew to express that agreement and the term "notes," the same gentleman's letter of June 19, 1863, which is part of the agreement, describes the agreement as covering "matter which you have written;" the formal instruments which Mr. Parsons drafted convey the "notes and other matter of his (Lawrence's) own composi- tion." "Notes for references" havebeenheld not to be restricted to foot-notes. Little v. Gould [Case No. 8,395], Mr. Lawrence prepai-ed the text with great care, labor, and judgment, from the different English and French edi- tions, so that it differed from any previous edition to the extent of sixty pages: this was stated in his preface as long ago as 1855. Mr. Dana's preface states that "this edition con- tains nothmg but the text of Mr. Wheaton according to his last revision, his notes, and the original matter contributed by the editor." yet he has exactly reprinted the text according to Mr. Lawrence's revision. T. K. Lothrop, for respondents. 2 The bill is founded on copyright. The prayer for relief determines the consti-uction of the bill, and shows this, 1 Daniell, Oh. Prac. 334, 383, 386, and cases cited; Adams, Eq. 309. The claim is rested on two grounds: First, a trust arising from the fact that the complainant's annotations were gratuitous, and an agreement and understanding at the outset that the copyright should be held on such a trust; second, upon a contract alleged to have been made between Mrs. Wheaton and the complainant, and to be contained in the mem- orandum dated June 14, 1863, a copy of which is set out in the bill. No trust arises by in- tendment of law from the fact that the com- plainant's labors were gratuitous. Hill, Trust. 107; Cook V. Fountain, 3 Swanst. 591; Young V. Peachy, 2 Atk. 256. The alleged "under- standing" is denied, and is not made out by the evidence. Even as stated by the com- plainant, it is too vague for a court to act
In this case four counsel were allowed to ar-
gue for the respondents, each counsel taking sep- arate points, but the court declared that this should not he a precedent for allowing more than I two counsel to speak on a side.
