covery should be made at this late day, but I have no right upon this record to deny it.
After this discovery was made, it would probably occur to any one interested to apply it in the art of curing fish, and the mode of application is simply to remove the membrane. I see no reason why the person who improves the art of curing fish by removing a part of the animal not before known to be injurious, but in reality so, should not have a patent for it. It is gratifying to know that the patentee is the person who made the discovery; but, in the absence of a theft, the one who communicates the fact to the public, and shows its application, would be, I should suppose, an inventor—at least under the older decisions—and, a fortiori, the discoverer of the fact. If the fact itself were well known, there might be no invention. For instance, to cure hams by salting and smoking would not sustain a patent if the virtues of salt and smoke were well known, and had been applied in analogous arts. It would not be invention to salt a fish more or less thoroughly. But a patent might properly be granted for curing fish with a substance which had never before been used for any similar purpose, and which would effect the old result of curing the fish in a better or cheaper way, of which last fact the infringement would be sufficient evidence. I am unable to distinguish between adding and taking away, if the result is to improve the art.
Decree for the complainant.
Green v. Gordon and others.
(Circuit Court D. Massachusetts. January 30, 1880.)
This was an action of contract, to which the defendants demurred.
The plaintiff was beneficial legatee of the income of the
