Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/632

620 FEDERAL REPORTER. �& New England Eailroad was to be a part of the Ime; but, by the publication of the libel, he lost the support of some of his associates, and of stockholders of that road, and suffered special damage. �The defendants answered — Flr.>t, that the statemjnts made in the article were true ; second, that the railroad concerning which the article waswrittenwas a public work of great importance to the commonwealth and people of Massachusetts, and in which the commonwealth was a large stockholder; that the other stockholders were numorous, and could only be reached through the press ; that the effort of the plain- tiff to obtain control of the railroad was a matter in which the public were interested, and was a proper subject of discussion in the news- papers; and that the defendants, believing that such control would be a public misfortune, and would be a serions injury to the railroad and to the public, discussed the plaintiff's plans and qualifications in good faith, and without malice; and that they made only such state- ments and reflections as they believed, on due inquiry and reasonable grounds, to be true and just, and warranted by the plaintiff's acts. To this second part of the answer the plaintiff demurred. �A. B. Wentworth and F. F. Heard, for plaintiff. �Russell e Putnam, for defendants. �LowBLL, G. J. For the purpose of deciding this demurrer it must be assnmed that the plaintiff had conceived and begun to carry ont a plan for making a railroad from Boston to New York by the consoli- dation of certain shorter Unes, and otherwise, and that it was a pa t of his plan to obtain control of the New York & New England Com- pany by electing directors favorable to his scheme; that the publica- tion of the article complained of interfered with this plan to hin prejudice; and that the statements of the article were not true, but were published in good faith, without express malice, and were, upon reasonable inquiry by the defendants, believed by them to be true. �The contention then is, on the part of the defendants, that the subject-matter is one in which the public has an interest, and that in discussing a subject of that sort a public speaker or writer is not bound at his peril to see that his statements are true, but has a qualified privilege, as it has been called, in respect to such matters. �The modern doctrine, as shown by the cases cited for the defend- ants, appears to be that the public has a right to discuss, in good faith, the public conduct and qualifications of a public man, such as a judge, an ambassador, etc., with more freedom than they can take with a private matter, or with the private conduct of any one. In ��� �