Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/638

626 FEDERAL REPORTER. �for contempt the order should be clear and certain in its terms, and as against a public officer, no doubt should exist whether it apj)lied to him or embraced the acts complained of . Weeks v. Smith, S Abb. Pr. 211; Whipple v. Hutcklnson, 4 Blatchf. 190; Vose v. Trustees, 2 Woods, 647. �2. The injunction order did not intelligibly recite the judgment referred to ; the copy exhibited to Wagner referred to a petition "an- nexed" which was not annexed; and the copy of the order gave no date of the judgment, but referred to a judgment for $36. The exe- cution recited a judgment of $45.72. The officer could not assume that the two judgments were the same. In re Metcalf, 46 Barb. 325, 329. �3. The property levied on was asserted by the bankrupt to be the property of his brother. Much of the controversy at the time of the levy related to that claim. The marshal was indemnified against it. As a last resort the injunction order was produced by the bankrupt, and shown, as he says, to the marshal, though the latter denies this, and it is not pretended that he had any previous knowledge of it. The circumstances were caloulated to arouse the suspicion of the marshal upon these several daims. I think he was not required, being indemnified, to run the personal risk of having the goods spir- ited away, even if this dubious injunction order was exhibited to him, by forbearing from his levy, while he should endeavor to do the best he could to supply the defects of the injunction order by ascertain- ing whether it was intended to apply to him or to the judgment which he held. �4. As to Youmans and Prentiss the motion should be denie d for additional reasons. The relaxation of the rule requiring personal serv- ice of an injunction order as the basis of proceedings for contempt, which is a well-settled ordinary rule, exists only in cases where it is necesaary in order that the ends of justice should not be defeated. This relaxation is not designed to dispense in the slightest degree with the service of the order, or due notice of it to those who are designed to be bound by it, where such service may be easily pro- cured in the ordinary course of legal proceedings. The cases in which it originated were those in which the party enjoined was personally in court and knew of the injunction order being directed, but vio- lated it before it could be entered and served. Skip v. Harwood, 3 Atk. 564; Cowelly. Collett, 3 Atk. 567; Hearii v. Tennant, 14 Ves. 136; Vassandan v. Rose, 2 J. & W. 264; Kimpton v. Eve, 3 Ves. & Bea. 349; McNeil v. Garratt, 1 Cr. & Ph. 97; Hull v. Thomas, 3 Edw. Ch. ��� �