Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/670

(J5S FEDESAli BEFOBTSB. �without the surety's consent diacharges him from liability; and this applies equally to the United States, and to any alterations of the contract made through the acts of its officers. U. S. v. Ilillegas, 3 Wash. 0. G. TO; U. S. y. TUlotson, 1 Paine, G. G. 305; U. S. v. Boecker, 21 Wall. 652; Miller v. ^tewart, 9 Wheat. 681 ; King v. Bald- ivin, 2 Johns. Ch. 560; Grant v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 93; U. S. v. Bost. wick, 9e U. S. 66; Cooke v. U.S. 91 U. S. 396. �If the secretary of the treasury had by express order, at the owner's request, extended the period of three years within which to pay the duties without the surety's consent, it cannot be doubted that such an extension of time would have discharged the surety, because it extended the duration of his risk. U. S. v. Hillegas, supra. By the regulations (article 158 of 1868; article 799 of 1874) such extensions of time are to be granted only upon the "concurrence of the surety." Or, had the secretary directed the delivery of the goods within the three years to the owner without payment of the duties owing upon them, and they were delivered accordingly, that also must have been held to be a discharge of the surety to the extent of the value of the goods released, as in cases between private individuals. "The United States," says the chief justice, in U. S. v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 66, "when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf. AU obligations which would be implied against citizens in the same circumstancea will be implied against them." �An extension of the time of payment discharges a surety, because it prolongs his risk by postponing his right of payment and subroga- tion, and by depriving him of his right of immediate recourse by suit against his principal for indemnity at the time when the debt was originally due. The contract by such extension is varied to hia prej- udice. U. S. V. Hillegas, 3 Wash. C. C. 76 ; King v. Baldwin, 2 Johns. Gh. 560;. Warner v. Beardsley, 8 Wend. 201; Brown v. Williams, 4: Wend. 360, 367. �The voluntary and deliberate postponement of the sale in this case effected precisely the same resuit, and operated in the same manner upon the surety's rights, as an extension of credit would have done. It necessatily prolonged his risk and suspended his right to proceed for his indemnity for three months, until after the next regulai sale; and it resulted in a prolongation of fifteen months. As respects the surety, the postponement was precisely equivalent to an extension of credit to the Owners of the goods until the next sale, and should, therefore, be held to discharge the surety in the same manner. ��� �