Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 4.djvu/503

CHESTER V. LIFE ASS'n OF AMERIOA. 489' �state courts, from whieh this court is not entirely exempt, beeause of the difficulty experienced of abandoning a habit of practice acquired in one court when coming into the other. The learned couasel for the petitioner here insists that this , application is supported by the English Cases, and frequent recognitions by the federal courts, and I have taken thia occasion to examine the subject with a view to ascertain the proper practice. There can be no doubt whatever that Kelfe's interest is of that character which renders it neces- sary for the plaintiff to bring him in as a party, and that without his presence as a defendant the suit could not pro- ceed. There has been a devolution of interest by operation of law, but he does not occupy the attitude of a purchaser pendente lite, to be brought in or not at the election of the plaintiff. He representa the company, as well as owns ita title, and he alone, the company being dissolved, can account for it, if an account shall be necessary. �The case comes, therefore, precisely within the category provided for by equity rule 57, and under ail the authoritiea the plaintiff cannot proceed without a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of revivor. Kennedy v. Georgia Bank, 8 How. 586, 610; Clarke v. Matthewson, 12 Pet. 164; Justice v. McBroom, 1 Lea, 555, at page 558; Northman v. Insurance Go. 1 Tenu. Ch. 317; Stretchy.Stretch, 2 Tenn. Gh. 140; Stede V. Taylor, 1 Minn. 274; Slackv.Walcott, 3 Mason, 508; Ander- son V. Railroad, 2 Woods, 628; 2 Danl. Ch, Pr. (5th Ed.) c» 33, p. 1506 et seq. �But the court has no power to compel the plaintiff to revive. He may file a new bill, if he choose, or never revive. Ho- might, I take it, go to Missouri, and file his bill there against. Ptelfe. Thompson v. Hill, 5 Yerg. 418; Spencer v. Wray, 1 Ver. 463 ; Ano?i. 3 Atk. 486. �This would seem a sufiScient reason for not allowing the petitioner, against the consent of the plaintiff, to become a defendant to this suit, were it not manifest that he haa an interest in ending this suit, at least, so far as to procure ^ dissolution of the injunction, which restraina him from real- izing his debt by a sale of his security. This is, it seenis to- ����