Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 4.djvu/786

772 PEDEBAIi BEPOBTBR. �tliat tlia recital is in any respect uncertain, informai, or însuf- ficient. �Another ground of the demurrer and motion to quash is that the writ oi sci. fa. was unuecessary, because the said Brown, administrator, had been by order of the court admitted as party plaintiff, and might at once, without a sel. fa., have had execution; it having been provided by the act of assembly of Maryland, known as the act of 1874, c. 320, that an exe- cution or attachment on any judgment might be issued at any time within 12 yeara from its date, when there had been no "discharge" of parties to said judgment by death or marriage. �Prior to the act of assembly of Maryland, of 1862, c. 262, § 16, a scire fadas was necessary whenever a new party was to be benefited or charged before execution could enure on a judgment. Trail v. Snouffer, 6 Md. 308. To facilitate the issuing of executions in cases where there had been i change of plaintiff, the act of 1862 enacted that, in case of the death or mirriage of any plaintiff, the executor, administrator, or other person who should be entitled to such judgment, should, on application to the court, be made parties to the same, and have such attachment or other execution as if no such death or marriage had taken place. This act, while it remained in force, rendered it unnecessary to have a writ of scire fadas upon the death of a plaintiff, but it was not in force when the writ in the present case was issued. It was repealed by the act of 1874, c. 320, which enacted in its stead that exe- cutions or attachments might issue on any judgment at any time within twelve years from the.date of such judgment, when there had been no "discharge" of parties to such judgment by death or marriage, omitting entirely the provision for sum- mary method of making new parties plaintifs which had for the first time been provided by the act of 1862. �Prior to 1862 the law of Maryland on this subject allowed executions to issue at any time within three years from the date of the judgment, where there had been no "change" of par- ties by death or marriage; and the act of 1874 uses precisely the earae language, except that the period is twelve yeara ����