Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/158

m FEDERAL REPORTEP �Neill V. Jackson and another. (District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania. , 1881.) �1. Decbee— Attacking Collatebailt. �The decree of a district court of the United Statea, upon a bill in equity filed by an assignee in bankruptcy against an assignee under the bankrupt's deed of voluntary assignmcnt, requiring the latter to deliver to the former assets of the bankrupt, is conclusive in all collateral proceedings. �2. Assignee— When Pkotected. �The voluntary assignee is entitled to the protection of such decree, notwith- standing, by consent of the parties, he vjthdrew his appeal therefrOm, and by the like consent the district court modifled ita decree, it appearing that he acted in good faith and under the advice of counsel. �3. SAKB— ACCOUNTING. �But the modified decree having excepted from the order directing the deliv- ery of the assets to the assignee in bankruptcy certain moneys which the vol- untary assignee had collected and claimed to have disbursed under the deed of voluntary asaignment, hdd, that to the extent of the excepted fund he might be compelled to settle an accoant of his trust in the state court having jurisdic- tion thereof. �S. T. Neill, for complainant. �John J. Henderson, for respondent. �In Equity. Sur application for injunction to restrain the defeiid- ants from proceeding in the court of common pleas of Crawford county, Pennsylvania, to compel Joseph A. Neill to settle an aecount as trustee under a deed of vojuntary assignaient, etc. �AcHESON, D. J. I agree with the learned counsel of the complain- ant as to the conclusive effect of the decree of this court (made by the late Judge Ketcham) in the case of William H. Abbott, assignee in bankruptcy of the Titusville Savings Bank, against Joseph A. Neill, in so far as that decree operated upon the assets of the bank- rupts by requiring the delivery thereof to the assignee in bankruptcy. No opinion having been filed by Judge Ketcham, the ground of his decision does not certainly appear. It is enough, however, that a decree was made by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and sub- ject-matter of the suit, and that the decree stands in force. It is true that, by consent of the parties, an appeal from said decree, which the complair aat, Neill, had taken to the circuit court, was subsequently withdrawn, and thereupon this court, by and with the like consent, modified its decree. But it seems to me that the complainant was not thereby deprived of the protection of the decree. There is noth- ing to suggest bad faith on his part in withdrawing his appeal, and he was acting under the advice of counsel learned in the law. Bradley's ��� �