Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/231

SPRIGO V. 8T0MP. 217 �eecuring the same from collateral attack, within certain limits, pro- vides that they shall not be so questioned, unless for one of the errors specified in the aforesaid five particulars. But the constitution of the state, as expounded by the supreme court in Tustin y. Gaunt, 3 Or. 306, having conferred the jurisdiction of probate matters upon the county courts and made them courts of general jurisdiction, their judgments in this respect, but for this statute, could not now be ques- tioned collaterally upon any ground except that of jurisdiction. Gager V. Henry, 5 Sawy. 237. �But no question is made in this case as to the suflBciency of the bond and oath of the guardian, or the notice and manner of sale ; and, if the court acquired jurisdiction to grant the license to sell, the sale was valid. It is true that the bond does not affirmatively appear to have been approved by the judge as required by the statute, (section 20, supra,) and was not filed until after the sale. But no objection ■was made on the trial to its admission on these grounds, and it is too late to do so now if desired. On the argument it was suggested that the county court of Polk county had jurisdiction to license this sale, because, in the language of the statute, (section 6, supra,) it was the court in which the guardian who made it was appointed, and therefore its regularity cannot be inquired into in this action. But we think the more reasonable construction of the clause (section 20, supra) — "was licensed to make the sale by a county court of com- petent jurisdiction" — is that the court which licensed the sale must not only have had jurisdiction potentially of the class of cases to which this belongs, but must have aotually acquired it in this par- ticular one by the presentation of a proper petition therefor — one containing the jurisdictional facts. �In Gager v. Henry, supra, this court — Field and Deady, JJ. — held that the application of a guardian to sell the lands of his ward was a proceeding in the nature of a proceeding in rem, conducted by the ward through his guardian in the interest and for the benefit of the former; that the court acquires jurisdiction thereof upon the filing of a proper petition therefor; and that the judgment of the court upon said petition cannot be questioned collaterally except as pro- vided by statute. �But the plaintiff contends that the order licensing this sale was void, because the petition therefor was not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, for the reason that it does not state with sufScient par- tieuhirity "the condition" of the ward's estate, or "the facts and circumstances" "tending to show the necessity or expediency of such ��� �