UNITED STATES V. STONE. 241 �did say; seoondly, because a person charged with a criminal offence is in such a state of mind as very often not to express his meaning with accuracy, and may be induced by reason of his distressing surroundings to conf ess guilt, when, in point of fact, no guilt exists. Again, the instruments of evidence may be corrupted ; that is, the person making the alleged confession, by reason of his occupation or interest in the particular trial, his zeal in procuring evidence, may exaggerate what defendant did say, and give it a color and meaning which he never intended. This being so, the law regards it as im- politic and Unjust to allow any defendant to be convicted of any crime upon his bare and unsupported confession of guilt, however plain and unequi vo- cal it may be, and requires, in addition to such confession, some evidence in- dependent of such confession which clearly shows that the crime charged in the indictment against the defendant has been committed. And in this case if the only proof showing that the defendant took the two bureaus, sofa, and mattress springs, charged in the indictment, from the steamer Vicksburgh, as above explained to you, is his confession, theu you must acquit him." �The court added this : �"If a confession be given under the duress of one in authority, either through promises. or threats, it canuot be admitted at all; but this is a ques- tion for the court, and I have admitted the testimOny of Bennett because he was not in authority. But, even when thus admitted, the weight of it is a question for you to determine. If given voluntarily, and without compulsion of threats or hope of profit, it is entitled to much weight, and should be satis- factory proof of guilt if corroborated by the other proof of facts and circum- stances in the case. The real question is whether there has been any threat or promise of such a nature that the accused would be likely to tell an'untruth from fear of the threat, or hope of profit from the promise. Steph. Dig. "Evidence," 73, note. If, therefore, in looking to the circumstances, you find no other proof of guilt except the bare confession, given under threats or promises of such a nature as to induce the defendant to falsely confess his guilt, you must acquit him. But if, taking the confession itself as detailed by Bennett, together with all the other proof in the case, you find facta and circumstances tending to prove its truth, you may look to it all and say whether he be guilty or not of the ofEence, as I have deseribed it to you in that part of this charge construing the statute." �The court refused the following instruction asked by the govern- ment: �"That, under the fourth count of this indictment, if they believe from the testimony that the defendant took the goods named in this count, or any of them, from the Mississippi river, (and that they belonged to the said steam- boat,) ' with the motive of gain or advantage to himself,' {lucri causa,) and if he knew at the tirae that they belonged to said steam-boat, or, under the cir- cumstances, could have reasonably ascertained this, and then fraudulently converted the goods to his own use or destroyed them, this is sufflcient evi- dence to justify the jury in flnding the felonious intent constituting larceny. If the defendant, under the proof, took the goods from the river, removed v.8,no.4— 16 ��� �
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