Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/263

UNITED STATES V. STONE, 249 �indiciment for larceny was insufficient, beeause it did not describe the statufory offence; and this, although both "steal" and "laiceny" appear in a technical sense in one of the sections ; for the state could not pimish the crime of larceny committed in another state, nor was there any such crime as larceny of a slave at common law. The offences were statutory, and must be se charged; and it will be found they were, when properly indicted, charged under a pleading using the words of the statute in one count, as to which I shall have occa- sion to speak further hereafter. I cite the cases now to demonstrate that the word "steal" does not always nor necessarily import the crime of larceny. If congresa had said that every person who shall steal goods belonging to a wreck, using no other words, I should probably hold it to denounce only acts constituting larceny at com- mon law, in obedience to our familiar rule of construction that when congress defines a crime by only using its oommon-law name, we interpret it by the common law; although, considering the character of the property and the nature of the jurisdiction, as arising out of the maritime and commercial control of the United States over the subject-matter, it might well be doubted if, strictly speaking, there could be a common-law larceny under the circumstances mentioned in this. statute, and whether the word "steal," when used in that con- nection, should not of itself mean more than it does at common law. Associated, as in this statute, with "plunder" and "destroy," I have no doubt it does mean a great deal more, and just what I charged the jury in this case. The Revised Statutes, in sections 5356 and 5357, taken partly from this same act of 1825, and partly from others, were dealing with larcenoy on the high seas, and the language used shows that if congress intended to punish only that offence in this section it would have employed the technical language for the purpose. The word "destroy" is also somewhat a maritime word, and is tised, as will be seen by other sections of this chapter of the Revised Statutes', to denote any kind of deprivation of the owner by demolish- ing, making way with, or other subversion of his property. Taken altogether, these three words comprehend any kind of taking with evil intent, and we have implied by them the animo fiirandi and lucri causa of larceny, the love of greed accompanying embezzlement, breach of trust, and such self-appropriation as escapes the punish- ment for larceny for. want of a trespass, and the wicked intent that belongs to such acts as we call malicious mischief, criminal tres- pass, and the like. Any of these intents are sufficient under the statute; and, although there must necessarily be a general evil ��� �