Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/390

376 FEDERAL REPORTER. �warrants were annesed to the bonds, or that there were any issued payable at an earlier date than April 1, 1874, which is the first date at which any coupons sued on were due. It could be no objection that the first coupon due became due more than six months from the date of the bond, and there is nothing in the complaint to show that it did not. Independently of this, the provision of the statute as to the interest was directory, and not of the essence of the power. �In RockCrcek y.Strong, 96 U. S. 277, the statute authorized bonds payable not more than 30 years from date. Bonds were issued pay- able 30 years and 35 days from date. The court held that this pro- vision was directory. �3. It is provided by subdivision 7 of section 5136 of the Revised Statutes, re-enacting section 8 of the act of June 3, 1864, (13 St. at Large, 101,) that every banking association shall have* power to «xercise — �"Ail such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of ex- change, and other evidences of debt, by receiving deposits, by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion, by loaning money on personal security." �The coupons appear by the complaint to be payable to bearer. They were, therefore, negotiable promissory notes, and there being nothing in the complaint to show that they were taken by the bank in a manner or at a time not authorized by law, it must, on a demurrer to the complaint, and under the averment in the complaint that the coupons were transferred to the bank for a valuable consideration, and that it is the holder and owner of them, be held that it acquired them in accordance with the statute, by discounting them, or by loan- ing money on them as personal security, they being personal security. But, aside from this, even if the court could say from the statute and the complaint that the bank was prohibited from becoming the trans- feree and owner of the coupons, the objection is one which cannot be raised by the party sued on the coupons, but is one which can be urged only by the government. Nat. Bank v. Mattheics, 98 U. S. 621 ; Bank of Genesee v. Whitney, 2 Morr. Trans. 399. �As the court below had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties in the suit, and as no error is disclosed in the pleadings or judgment, and as nothing found in the bill of exceptions can be eonsidered, the judgment, being a proper judgment in form, on proper pleadings, must be presumed to be right, and on that ground must be afiSrmed, with costs, without re-examining any questions of law or ��� �