Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/392

378 FEDERAL REPORTER, �property should be returned to the grantore; that the plaintifi was not a party to the deed and never assented thereto ; that on April 6, 1874, new assignments were made to said Chafiee by A. & W. Sprague, as a firm and individually, of said property covered by said eertificate of lien, which assignments were also fraudaient and void as to the .plaintiii, for divers alleged reasons, one of which was that the object of said assignments was to postpone and delay the creditors of the said Spragues. The petition further alleged that Amasa Sprague, William Sprague, and said Chaffee are in possession of said real estate, and prayed for a foreclosure of said judgment lien, for posses- sion of said premises, that the trust deed and assignments be declared to be void and of no effeet, that the title of Chaffee may be postponed to that of the plaintiff, and for damages. �The joinder of causes of action at law and in .equity is permit- ted by the recent practice act of this state. The action was re- moved to this court, and the defendants demurred upon the ground that the complaint joins in one proceeding a cause of action at law for damages, and a cause of action in equity, and that said complaint contains distinct matters, in which the defendants are not both inter- ested, viz. : the foreclosure of a judgment lien, and the setting aside a trust deed to Chafiee. �As to the first cause of demurrer, the plaintiff admits that, by the equity rules and practice of the United States courts, legal and equitable grounds of relief cannot be joined in a bill in equity, and moves for leave to amend by erasing the prayer for damages, which motion is granted without costs. �The second cause for demurrer presents the question which is in dispute. �Judge Story (Eq. PI. § 271) defines multifarionsness to be — �"The improperly joining in one bill distinct and independent matters, and thereby conf ounding them ; as, for example, the uniting in one bill of several matters, perfectly distinct and unconnected, against one defendant; or the demand of several matters of a distinct and independent nature, against sev- eral defendants, in the same bill." �It is said by the defendants that in this bill there are two subjects which are distinct and independent : First, the foreclosure of a judgment lien upon the interest of the Spragues in the land; and second, the setting aside of a prior deed to Chaffee. While this two- fold prayer may come within the letter of th' definition of multifa- rionsness, I do not think that it comes within the evil which the rule was intended to prevent, viz. : the uniting in one suit questions which ��� �