Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/465

HUNTINGTOK V. PALME». iSl �latger part ot the suits for restraining collection of taxes which now corne intt» the courts. We lay it down with unanimity as a rule to govem the courts of the United Sijates in their action in ^uch cases." �: .^swe understand it, the court distinotly holds that some tax, according to some rule of taxation, ought to be paid on all tax- able property, and that a bill ^jrhioh doesnofc. allege a payiment of so much of ^the tax as the party conoedes> or, if not conceded, may be seen from the bjll or shown by aflSdavit, Qught tobe assessed and paid,: does not present any equity to jnsrttify an injuactiofl. And the court takes particular pains to say to the circuit cowts that they are expected tq conform to this view. Its language is : "We lay it down with una* nimity as a rule to govfirn the eowrt$ of the United States in their action in such cases." Id. 617. The defendant endeavors to distinguish ihe present case from those cited, on the ground that in the latter the assessments were -merely unequal, and therefore only void as to the excess; while in this case the tax is unconstitutional and void in its- entirety. We have always supposed that' the assessment of a iax m solido, which is void as to part, is wholly void. And the bills "in the cases cited alleged the tax to be wholly void. Id. 589. But, however this may be, t^e supreme court at the last term determined this pre- cise point, also, adversely to defendant, in the German National Bank of Chicago v. Kimball, Collector, etc. The bill was dismissed by the circuit court on demurrer. It alleged the tax to be in violation of both the acts of congress and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and wholly void, as in this case. The decree dismissing the bill was afiBrmed by the supreme court. The supreme court,! in affirming the decree, says: �" "We think there are two fatal objections to the bill. The flrst of these is that there is no offer to pay any sum as a tax ivhioh the shares of the bank ought to pay. We have announced more than once that it is the established rule of this court that no one can be permitted to go into a court of equity to enjoin the collection of a tax until lie bas shown himself entitled to the aid of the court by paying so much of the tax assessed agaiust him as it eau be plainly seen he ought to pay." �The court further says : . ; �" The bill attempts to evade this rule by alleging that the tax is wholly void, and therefore none of it ought to be paid; and that, by reason of the absence of all uniformity of values, it is impossible for any person to eompute or ascertain what the stockholders of the complainant bank ought to pay on the shares of the bank." �This is precisely the distinction sought to be drawn here between this case and the State Raikoad Tax Cases. But the supreme court, ��� �