Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/481

MIBSOTJKI FURKACB 00. V. COCHEAN. 467 �the purchaser requires to put himself in the same condition as if the contract had been performed." That resuit— which is compensation — is secured, it seems to me, by the rule given to the jury here, un- less the case is exceptional. The vendee's real loss, whether delivery is to be made at one time or in instalments, ordinarily is the differ- ence between the contract price and the market value at the times the goods fehould be delivered. If, however, the article is of' limited production, and cannot, for that or other reason, be obtained in the market, and the vendee suffers damage beyond that difference, the measure of damages may be the actual loss he sustains. McHose v. Fulmer, 73 Pa. St. 367; Richardson v. Chynoweth, .26'Wis. 656; Sedg- wick on Dam. 554. With this qualification to meet exceptional cases, the rule that the damages are to be assessed with reference to the times the contract should be performed, furnishes, I think, a safe and just standard from which it Would be hazardous to depart. �In this case-I fail to perceive anything to call for a departure from that standard. There was no evidence of any special damage to the piaintiff by the stoppage of its furnaces or otherwise. Furthermore, the contract with Hudson, February 27, 1880, was made at a time when the coke market was excited and in an extraordinary condition. Unexpectedly and suddenly coke had risen to the unprecedented priee of four dollars per ton; but this rate was of brief duration. The inarket declined about May 1, 1880, and by the middle of that month the price had fallen to one dollar and thirty cents per ton. The good faith of the piaintiff in entering into the new contract cannot be questioned, but it proved a most unfortunate venture. By the last of May the piaintiff had in its hands more coke than was required in its business, and it prooured — at what precise loss does not clearly ap- pear — the cancellation of contracts with Hutchinson to the extent of 20,000 tons. As the piaintiff was not bound to enter into the new forward contract,. it seems to me it did so at its own risk, and cannot fairly claim that the damages chargeable against the defendant shall be assessed on the basis of that contract. �The motion for a new trial is denied. ��� �